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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
Devon D., INC., a Utah
Corporation,

BRIEF OF APPELLEES

Plaintiff, Appellant,
vs.

Civil No. 930406 CA
Priority #15

HOWARD NELSON, SHARON NELSON,
Defendants, Appellees,

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal was brought pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure. This Court has appellate
jurisdiction of this case pursuant to title 78 part 2a,
section 3(2)(k) of the Utah Code (1953 as amended.)
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a Decree and Judgment, entered by
the Fourth District Court December 29, 1992, following a trial
to the bench on the 20th and 21st days of April and the 18th,
19th, and 20th days of May, 1992.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
Devon D. presents two issues on appeal:
1.

Did the court error in its findings of fact by

including some, but not all of Devon D.'s exhibits in
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calculating the amount of the benefit received by the Nelsons.
2.

Did the court error as a matter of law when it

refused to grant pre-judgment interest on any additional sums,
not granted in the judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Devon D.'s first allegation of error involves a factual
finding by the court.

"Findings of fact, whether based on

oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses" Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Devon

D.'s second allegation of error involves the application of
law to facts.

Legal conclusions are reviewed for correction

of error. Marchant v Park City, 771 P.2d 677, 680

(Utah App

1989) aff'd, 788 P.2d 520 (Utah 1990).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a case involving a dispute over the amount of
money owed by Howard and Sharon Nelson (hereafter "Nelsons")
to Devon D., and to quiet title to land.

Devon D. filed its

complaint on or about February 23, 1989, (Rd. 5) alleging a
debt owed by Nelsons to Devon D. based on contract.

The

complaint alleged the amount owed "totalled over $60,000.00."
The complaint also alleged Nelsons were indebted to workers,
materialmen, suppliers and subcontractors in the amount of
$125,000.00.

Devon D. sought payment from Nelsons of
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$60,000.00 and either payment of an additional $125,000.00 to
Devon D., or indemnity to Devon D. for contingent claims which
may be brought against Devon D. arising out of the
construction of the home. (Rd. 5)

Nelsons answered by denying

that the amounts claimed were owed (Rd. 41).
Devon D. filed an amended complaint on or about January
3, 1990, (Rd. 150). The amended complaint changed the amount
Devon D. alleged it was owed from $60,000.00 to $56,250.76
plus interest, and changed the amount it claimed was owed to
others from $125,000.00 to $64,235.00.

Devon D. sought

recovery of the above sums through its amended complaint.
Nelsons answered the amended complaint denying the amounts
claimed were owed.

In the amended complaint an issue of title

to land was raised which issue was resolved by stipulation
before the trial.
Prior to trial Nelsons satisfied all other materialmen
and labormen named.
the trial.

No other named defendants participated in

During trial Nelsons acknowledged that some

specific payments by Devon D. paid for materials and/or labor
for the Nelson home (Tr. 213-216)
The issues for the court to determine at trial were:
a.

Did an agreement for repayment exist between Devon

D. and Nelson, and if so, what were the conditions of
payment, and were the conditions met.
b.

What amount if any did the Nelsons owe to Devon D.
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under the agreement or otherwise.
c.

Was Devon D. entitled to interest on any money owed

to it by Nelsons.
After trial to the bench, the court entered its
memorandum decision dated July 15, 1992, and Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law were entered December 28, 1992, (Rd.
464, 514). On the issues presented at trial the court ruled:
a.

No contract existed between the parties.

b.

Nelsons owed Devon D. $41,069.39 under the theory of

quantum meruit.
c.

Devon D. was not entitled to pre-judgment interest

on the amount owed.
Devon D. appealed the money judgment and the denial of
pre-judgment interest. (Rd. 521.1)

Nelsons appealed, but

later dismissed their cross-appeal (Rd. 524). On Nelsons'
motion this court dismissed Devon D.'s appeal as to its claims
of pre-judgment interest on the judgment as to which
satisfactions of the judgment have been filed in the trial
court, and ordered the appeal to proceed on appellants
remaining claims.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Nelsons object to and dispute the statement of facts
represented by Devon D.

Its statement of facts include many

"factual" representations which lack citations to the record
or trial transcript as required by Rule 24(7) and 24(e) Utah
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Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Some citations to the record

provided in Devon D.'s statement of fact contain no support
for the representation.

Nelsons provide the following factual

statement for the benefit of the court.
Howard Nelson arranged for the construction of his home
by Nathan Chappell (Tr 253).

Work by Nathan Chappell

commenced ("the first contract") but stopped after a while.
This work and stoppage occurred before Nelson was introduced
to Gordon Griffin, a representative of Devon D. (Tr 21).

A

meeting was held where Chappell, Nelson and Griffin were
present and an agreement was reached whereby bills for labor
and invoices were to be paid by Devon D.

Based on that

agreement bills and invoices were to be delivered to an
employee of Devon D. who would write out checks for Griffin's
signature.

Materials could also be purchased on Devon D.

accounts to be paid by Devon D. (Tr 261-262).

At the same

time the Nelsons' home was being constructed, Chappell worked
on other construction projects for Mr. Griffin's benefit (Tr
118-121) . Mr. Griffin was aware of Nelsons' concerns
regarding Mr. Chappell's honesty and integrity (Tr 122, 129).
After the agreement was reached, payments were made by Devon
D., and paid to or through Mr. Chappell upon Mr. Chappell's
request, based solely upon Mr. Chappell's representation that
money was owed, without invoices, receipts or bills from the
providers of goods and services (Tr 129-130, 161-162) . After
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completion of a majority of the construction, Devon D.
provided Nelsons with inconsistent demands for payment (Tr
133, 135-139, 144). Included in the demands for payment were
many expenses incurred by Devon D. which did not relate to the
construction of the Nelson home (Tr 151-152, 154, 158, 374,
416, 492-497, 595).
After trial, the court reviewed the testimony and
evidence presented, entered its findings

and awarded Devon D.

recovery for unjust enrichment calculated upon the amount of
some of the checks presented as exhibits at trial (Rd. 514).
The court's findings specified the exhibits upon which it
would grant recovery and excluded the following exhibits as a
basis for recovery.
Exhibit #

Check #

Amount Claimed

Trans Page

P-l
P-5
P-9a
P-9b
P-ll
P-18
P-25
P-27
P-28
P-30
P-34
P-36
P-40
P-42
P-49
P-50
P-55
P-59
P-60
P-61
P-68
P-69

288
418
441
445
464
484
502
506
507
513
527
536
545
547
561
563
579
586
588
599
631
632

111.74
,051.00
$1,
$1,,669.00
404.00
$
,054.00
$1,
26.36
$
293.00
$
320.00
$
840.00
$
360.00
$
$1,,500.00
$1,,500.00
40.00
$
104.00
$
330.00
$
67.00
$
26.00
$
106.00
$
200.00
$
075.13
$1,r
52.50
$
635.00
$

273
364
367
367
370
375
377
380
380, 381
383
150, 387
390
392
113, 202,
72, 399
72, 399
72, 399
73, 176
408
408
178
183

$
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P-72
P-73
P-103
P-86
P-91
P-88a
P-77
P-83
P-80

663
665
671
0
Z
128
761
343
1011

Total

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

60.00
500.00
14.85
107.82
215.82
78.00
111.16
174.50
169.50

73, 181
413
409
416
186, 187
342, 417, 418
186, 187, 203
186, 186
186, 187, 206

$13,196.38

For each check on which the court denied recovery,
evidence was presented at trial indicating the check did not
pay for goods or services which benefited Nelsons, or left
doubt whether the checks paid for goods or services for the
benefit of

Nelsons (Tr 150-152, 176- 178, 181, 183, 186-187,

202-203, 206, 367, 377, 380, 408).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The trial court, under an equitable theory of contract
implied in law, calculated the benefit received by Nelsons by
reviewing each check presented then determining whether to
include that check in its calculation of the total amount
expended on the Nelson home. Testimony on all of the checks
not included weighed in favor of not including those checks in
the amount of the judgment.
checks

Since the evidence on those

was substantial, competant and admissable, the trial

court's decision should not be disturbed.
The trial court properly applied prior case law in
determining no prejudgment interest should be added to the
amount of the judgment.
MARSHALLING OF THE EVIDENCE
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To challenge a finding of fact, Devon D. must demonstrate
that the finding was clearly erroneous, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure 52(a); Crouse v. Crouse 817 P.2d 836, 838 (Utah App.
1991).

To demonstrate that a finding is clearly erroneous,

Devon D. is required to first marshall all the evidence that
supports the finding and then demonstrate that despite this
evidence, the finding is so lacking in support as to be
"against the clear weight of the evidence" Id.

"If the

appellant fails to marshall the evidence the appellate court
assumes that the record supports the findings of the trial
court and proceeds to a review of the accuracy of the lower
court's conclusions of law and application of that law in the
case"

Saunders v. Sharp 806 P.2d 18, 19 (Utah 1991).
Devon D. has failed to marshall all evidence supporting

the court's findings of fact.

Much of the evidence marshalled

by Devon D. is presented as opinion and observation, and does
not actually represent all evidence that supports the finding.
In its attempt to marshall the evidence, Devon D. occasionally
fails to include specific evidence presented at trial
favorable to appellee.

Within the marshalling of evidence

supportive of the court's finding Devon D. tries to discredit
or oppose the evidence presented.
The following is Nelsons' marshalling of evidence
supportive of the court's failure to include compensation for
checks listed previously herein.

8

Nathan Chappell testified he was authorized to charge on
the Devon D. account at BMC West, and he sent other people to
charge on that same account (Tr 488)

He further testified

that BMC West, its employees or his employer would make a
notation where the materials were shipped to (Tr. 488-489).
When the invoices were reviewed by Devon D.'s secretary, she
would note on the check which job to charge it to based on the
information on the invoice (Tr. 488-489)

Mr. Chappell

testified that if somebody gave a job name different than the
correct job name, neither Devon D. nor its secretary would
know of the error (Tr. 489). Mr. Chappell and his employees
worked at more construction sites than just the Nelsons (Tr.
489-491).

Mr. Chappell testified that he kept no notes and

that charges were placed on Nelsons' home in error (Tr. 4934 95).

Mr. Chappell testified at trial that his memory was not

good (Tr. 430-431).

Mr. Chappell also acknowledged that his

testimony at trial was contradictory to his testimony at an
earlier deposition (Tr. 495-496).
Concerning Exhibit 1, Check #288 to BMC West for $300.00.
No invoice accompanied the check to show what was purchased,
nor how much of the total was purchased for Nelsons' home
(Exhibit P-l). Mr. Chappell could not establish from his
records or memory or accounting system how much, if any of the
$300.00 was spent on materials for Nelsons' home (Tr. 4984 99) . No evidence to show what was purchased or how much of
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the $300.00 was spent on materials for the Nelsons' home was
presented other than the check itself.
Concerning Exhibit 5, Check #418 to John Mulliner for
$1,051.00.

Mr. Chappell testified that the payment was made

to an attorney, and that John Mulliner was an attorney for a
roofer, or possibly a roofing supplier (Tr. 500-501).
Chappell testified he had no way of knowing if the $1,051.00
created a benefit to Howard Nelson (Tr. 501). No invoice,
bill or other evidence was presented at trial showing a
benefit to Nelson from the payment to John Mulliner.
Concerning Exhibit 9a, Check #441 to Nila Chappell for
$1,669.00.

Chappell testified on direct examination that he

did not know what the payments were for (Tr. 367). No
invoice, bill or other evidence was presented to show that
Nelsons' derived a benefit from Devon D.'s payment to Nila
Chappell on this exhibit.
Concerning Exhibit 9b, Check #455 to Nate Chappell for
$404.00.

Chappell testified on direct examination that the

payment was to reimburse Chappell for labor and supplies he
picked up (Tr. 367). On further examination he testified he
did not know what the expenditure was for (Tr. 368). No
invoice, bill or other evidence was presented indicating what
labor or materials were purchased or that Nelson derived a
benefit from the payment to Nate Chappell.
Concerning Exhibit 11, Check #464 to AmFac Electric for
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$1,054.48.

Chappell testified he did not know if this was

paid to AmFac for improvement to the entire subdivision or for
improvement to the Nelsons7 home. (Tr. 507). No invoice, bill
or other evidence was presented indicating what was purchased,
nor that Nelsons derived any benefit from the Devon D.'s
payment to AmFac.
Concerning Exhibit 18, Check #484 to Superior Insulation
for $60.00.

On direct examination, Chappell testified

insulation was purchased for the playroom over the garage (Tr.
375-376) . On cross examination he testified that the front
page of the insulation invoice had a notation in black ink,
the first page showing a different invoice number.

On

the third page of an invoice bearing a different invoice
number a notation of Nelsons home was made in red ink.

He

also testified he did not know why there were different
invoice numbers, nor who made the Nelson notation.

He also

testified no notation was made when the insulation was picked
up and that he did not know where in the Nelson home the
insulation may have gone. (Tr. 510-511).
Concerning Exhibit 25, Check #502 to Nate Chappell for
$293.00.

Chappell testified this was reimbursement for a

building permit (Tr. 377-378) then negated his testimony.
Chappell ultimately testified he did not know what the payment
to him was for (Tr. 513-514).

No invoice, bill or other

evidence was presented at trial showing a benefit to Nelson
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from Devon D.'s payment to Chappell.
Concerning Exhibit 27, Check #506 to Tom Green for
$320.00.

Chappell testified on direct examination that he had

no knowledge if Tom Green worked on Nelsons' home (Tr. 380).
No invoice, bill or other evidence was presented at trial
showing that this payment to Tom Green was for a benefit
provided to Nelsons.
Concerning Exhibit 28, Check #507 to Wayne Knight for
$408.00.

Chappell testified that Wayne Knight supplied him

with invoices when he requested payment (Tr. 381). Devon D.
presented no invoice, bill or other evidence indicating the
type or amount of labor or materials supplied by Wayne Knight
for payment by Check #507 even though it presented invoices
indicating time, date and amount of work performed with other
checks paid "to Mr. Knight.

On direct examination, Mr. Knight

testified that he worked on numerous jobs for Mr. Chappell and
Devon D. during the relevant time, including curb and gutter
work throughout the subdivision (Tr. 608), and a house in
Woodland (Tr. 609). Mr. Knight was unable to identify what
work he performed or on which property in exchange for payment
by Exhibit 28 (Tr. 614). No other evidence was presented
showing any benefit to Nelsons by Devon D.'s payment to Mr.
Knight by Exhibit 28.
Concerning Exhibit 34, Check #527 negotiated by Nila
Chappell for $1,500.00. Although Mr. Chappell testified on

12

direct examination that it was payment through Nila Chappell
for purchase of cabinets (Tr. 387) , on cross examination
Chappell acknowledged the notation on the check indicated
payment for "Nate's Bond", that the payee's name on the check
had been whited out and changed, and that no invoice or bill
for cabinets was available to identify the purpose of the
check (Tr. 150-152).

No invoice, bill or other evidence was

presented showing that the Nelsons received any benefit by
Devon D.'s payment of $1,500.00 to Nila Chappell.
Concerning Exhibit 37, Check #513 to Keith Lewis for
$360.00.

Mr. Chappell testified he could produce no invoice

showing what work Keith Lewis was paid for, or that the work
was performed at Nelsons' home (Tr. 576) and that Keith Lewis
worked at several jobs for Mr. Chappell (Tr. 3 84).
Concerning Exhibit 37, Check #536 to Nathan Chappell for
$1,500.00.

Although Chappell testified it was reimbursement

for money he spent on plumbing fittings (Tr. 3 91), he produced
no invoices or receipts, and could not explain why the total
was an even $1,500.00. He later admitted the amount was not
all for plumbing and did not know why the check was not paid
directly to the supplier (Tr. 518-519).
Concerning Exhibit 42, Check #547 to Gordon Griffin for
$104.00.

Mr. Griffin testified he had no basis to charge that

expense to Nelsons' home except for the notations on the check
(Tr. 202-203).

No invoice, bill or other evidence was
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presented showing that the Nelsons received any benefit by
Devon D.'s payment of $104.00 to Gordon Griffin.
Concerning Exhibit 49, Check #561 to Nathan Chappell for
$330.00.

Chappell testified he requested and received the

payment from Devon D. because he needed money (Tr. 520). He
also testified that he had agreed with Nelsons that Nelsons
were not obligated to pay for Chappell's work, and that the
$330.00 was not to be charged to Nelson (Tr. 520-521).
Concerning Exhibit 50, Check #563 to Gordon Griffin for
$67.00.

Mr. Griffin testified he did not know the reason for

the payment and did not testify to any benefit Nelson received
by Devon D.'s payment of $67.00 to Gordon Griffin (Tr. 154155) .
Concerning Exhibit 59, Check #586 to Gordon Griffin for
$106.00.

Mr Griffin was not able to identify with any

particularity the benefit to Nelson for which he was paying.
Mr. Griffin testified the invoice attached to the exhibited
indicated all work was performed at another house in another
city (Tr. 177-178).
Concerning Exhibit 60, Check #588 to Nathan Chappell for
$200.00.

Chappell testified that he kept no records of time

spent on the Nelson home, that he requested payment of $200.00
from Devon D. because he needed money to survive that week
(Tr. 408). Chappell also testified that Nelson owed him no
money for his work and was not responsible for payments made
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to him (Tr. 520-521).
Concerning Exhibit 61, Check #599 to Nathan Chappell for
$1,075.13.

Chappell testified this was reimbursement for

labor and materials he supplied to Nelson.

However, he could

not identify the labor or the materials which were supplied
(Tr. 408-409) . No invoice, bill or other evidence was
presented showing that the Nelsons received any benefit by
Devon D.'s payment of $1,075.13 to Nathan Chappell.
Concerning Exhibit 68, Check #631 to Robert Matt for
$52.50.

Chappell testified that because of an error on his

part, he was obligated to re-roof the Nelsons7 home.

He

supplied materials at his own expense, and labor was performed
by all roofers at no charge to Nelsons except for the labor of
Robert Matt.

Chappell further testified he had no

justification for Nelson to pay the costs of Robert Matt (Tr.
525-527) .
Concerning Exhibit 69, Check #632 to Aspen Interiors for
$635.00.

Mr. Griffin testified that Aspen Interiors belonged

to Mr. Chappell's wife Nila Chappell.

Mr. Griffin testified

he paid this check to Aspen Interior in belief he was paying a
debt owed to Max Brown for plumbing.

He had no invoice, no

evidence indicating the amount of labor or materials, nor did
he present evidence that Devon D.'s payment to Aspen was paid
to Max Brown or otherwise used for the benefit of Nelsons (Tr.
183-185) .
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Concerning Exhibit 72, Check #663 to Gordon Griffin for
$60.00.

Mr Griffin testified he cashed the check to pay for

labor.

Devon D. presented no invoice, bill or other evidence

of the type or amount of labor and whether it was performed
nor any benefit to Nelsons from this payment (Tr. 181-182) .
Concerning Exhibit 73, Check #665 to Keith Lewis for
$500.00.

No evidence was presented to show that Nelsons owed

payment to Keith Lewis for $500.00. Although Chappell
testified Lewis performed some carpentry service, no contract,
invoice, bill or other documentation or evidence was produced
showing their payment of $500.00
performed on Nelson's home.

related to work Lewis

Chappell testified that Lewis

worked on several jobs for Chappell, and acknowledged the
notation on the check indicated payment on Nate's bond (Tr.
527-528).
Concerning Exhibit 77, Check #761 to Farmers Insurance
for $111.16; and concerning Exhibit 80, Check #1011 for
insurance for $169.50; and concerning Exhibit 83, Check #343
to Farmers Insurance for $174.50; and concerning Exhibit 91,
Check #2 to Rick Lee Insurance for $486.00; Mr. Griffin
testified these were paid to purchase insurance on the
Nelsons' home, naming Devon D. as beneficiary.

The insurance

did not list Nelson as a contingent beneficiary of the policy.
Mr, Griffin testified this insurance provided no benefit to
Nelsons (Tr. 203-204 and 187-188).
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Concerning Exhibit 86, Check #0 to Nila Chappell for
$107.82.

Mr Chappell testified this payment was a

reimbursement for materials and labor on the Nelson home, but
no invoice, bill or other evidence was presented to establish
that Nelson actually received a benefit from this payment to
Mrs. Chappell (Tr. 416-417).
Concerning Exhibit 103, Check #671 to BMC West for
$119.54 which included a claim of $14.85 charged by Devon D.
to Nelson.

Mr. Chappell testified he believed the original

accounting was in error reducing the Nelson portion from
$97.08 to $14.85 because of confusion in billing invoices to
the wrong job (Tr. 425-429).

No evidence was provided to

determine the accuracy of Devon D.'s claim that Nelsons owed
the balance of $14.85 other than Chappell's memory.

Mr.

Chappell testified on cross examination that his memory was
poor (Tr. 430-431).
ARGUMENT I
Evidence supports the trial court's decision not to include
certain exhibits when calculating the value of the benefit to
Nelsons.
The trial court found that no express contract nor
contract implied in fact existed between the parties.

The

court found a contract implied in law did exist between the
parties.

There is no dispute on appeal regarding the legal

theory under which the judgment was entered.

The first issue

on appeal is Devon D.'s contention that the court
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miscalculated the value of the benefit received by Nelsons.
The only evidence presented at trial regarding the value of a
benefit to Nelsons was evidence of payments Devon D. claimed
to have made for labor and materials for the Nelson home.
Devon D.'s claim of error is that the court failed to include
in the calculation of damages all payments Devon D. claimed to
have made.
To permit recovery under a claim of unjust enrichment, or
contract implied in law, the court must at a minimum receive
competent and substantive evidence that the Nelsons received a
benefit from the action of Devon D. (See 1A. Corbin, Corbin
on Contracts 19, at 44, 46 (1963) and Davies v Olsen, 746 P.2d
264 (Utah App. 1987).

While Nelsons acknowledged at trial

that some of Devon D.'s espenditures were properly charged
against the Nelson home, other expenditures claimed by Devon
D. were not spent on the Nelsons home, nor were they for the
Nelson's benefit.
Devon D.'s theory at trial, and again on appeal is flawed
in several particulars.

Under its theory, if the court

accepts any of the checks as having been paid for the benefit
of the Nelsons, it must accept all of the checks as being paid
for the benefit of the Nelsons.

Such an approach would negate

Devon D.'s obligation to prove that each payment was paid on
the Nelson House as opposed to other houses on which Devon D.
and the contractor were working.
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The checks which the court

did not include in calculating the value of the benefit to
Nelsons were properly excluded from that calculation.

Those

checks fall into one or more of the following categories:
1)

Expenditures from which Devon D.'s witnesses

testified Nelsons received no benefit;
2)

Expenditures from which no evidence was presented at

trial showing that a benefit was received by Nelsons; and,
3)

Expenditures for which there is conflicting testimony

as to whether Nelsons received a benefit.
The first category includes exhibits P-49, P-60, P-77, P80, P-83, and P-91.
Nathan Chappel.

Exhibits P-49, and P-77 were payments to

Mr Chappelll testified at trial he was not

entitled to receive those payments at Nelsons's expense.

The

remaining exhibits in this group constitute payments by Devon
D. for the purchase of insurance naming Devon D. as
beneficiary.
policies.

Griffin testified Nelson had no interest in the

Griffin also testified Nelson received no benefit

from the purchase of this insurance.

As to this first group,

the court properly excluded these payments in computing the
value of a benefit to Nelsons.

For the exhibits referred to

in this paragraph, the evidence presented by Devon D.'s
witnesses was clear that Nelsons received no benefit from
these expenditures.
The second category includes exhibits P-l, P-5, P-ll, P27, P-36, P-42, P-49 and P-59.

The only evidence to support
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a claim that payment of these check benefitted Nelson, was a
notation on the checks themselves indicating that the drawer
of the check thought the payment was related to the Nelson
home, although no invoice, bill or other evidence of labor or
materials provided to Nelsons house was presented.

Proof

that Devon D. wrote checks, is insufficient to conclude that
the check provided a benefit to Nelsons, even if at the time
Devon D. thought they might have applied to the Nelson home.
For each of these checks, Devon D. could not, or did not
present evidence to the court from which the court could
conclude that the payments were made for the benefit of
Nelsons.
The third category includes exhibits

P-9a, P-9b, P-18,

P-25, P-28, P-34, P-40, P-55, P-61, P-68, P-69, P-72, P-73, P86, P-88a and P-103.

In each of these cases, evidence was

provided, usually by the same witness, which would support a
finding either that the expense was made on the Nelson home,
or that it was not.

In these instances, the court was

required to assess the witness' credibility, and the
circumstances surrounding the payments to determine factually
if the court was convinced the payments were used to benefit
the Nelsons.

As to these checks, the court had substantial,

competent and admissible evidence that there was no benefit to
the Nelsons.

Factual findings are given considerable

deference because of the trial court's ability to assess the
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witnesses7 credibility, and will only be reversed on appeal if
they are clearly erroneous.
ARGUMENT II
Although evidence may be admissable, the Court may determine
it to be inadequate, or lacking in weight when viewed in light
of other
evidence presented at trial.
Devon D.'s position at trial, and again on appeal has
been that if evidence is admissible under an exception to the
hearsay rule, it must be accepted by the court as conclusive,
uncontrovertible evidence.

This approach ignores the role of

the trier of fact's in considering the weight of the evidence.
While allowing Devon D. to present its hearsay evidence, the
trial court openly addressed it reservations regarding the
weight such evidence would carry.

The trial court

acknowledged the distinction between admissability and weight
while ruling on the Nelson's objections to the admissibility
of the checks;
I suppose that's the question to which the Court has to
decide, is [sic] whether or not this has any support.
Contention is that Mr. Chappell was not reliable in this
aspect, that there was money going form one place to
another. I don't have any question but what the records
were kept in the course of the business. The question
the Court has is how reliable they may be. And that may
be nothing more than a question of what is afforded the
document (Tr 360).
Nelson's argument was and still is that merely having a
notation with the Nelson's name on a check, does not provide
sufficient information for the court to conclude that the
proceeds from that check actually went to the improvement of
21

the Nelson's house.

Evidence at trial suggested several other

possible uses of those funds. Mr. Griffin was constructing
several other houses at the same time as the was paying bills
for the Nelson house.

Mr. Chapell understood he was to

provide an invoice or bill for each check which was written to
verify the materials or labor supplied.
did not supply an invoice nor a bill.

In some instances he
In some instances Mr.

Chappell obtained payments from Devon D. which he was not
entitled to, but he took because "he needed the money".
draws would be charged to Nelsons.

These

Mr. Chappell was building

other homes in addition to the Nelson home during the time of
construction.

Numerous employees had access to Devon D.'s

open accounts, and could shift liability for their purchases
without detection.

In several instances at trial, it was

shown that checks bearing only the name Nelson, referred to a
different Nelson for whom Chappell was making repairs,
nevertheless, this Nelson was billed.

It was within the

purview of the trial court to weight these factors.

It was

also within the court's authority to include in its
calculation of damages only those checks for which Devon D.
presented an invoice, a bill or some other form of
corroboration.

Given the totality of the circumstances

regarding the method of Devon D.'s record keeping, or lack
thereof, it was reasonable for the trial court to not include
all exhibits in calculating the amount of benefit to the
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Nelsons even if the notation of "Nelson" appears on a corner
of the check.
ARGUMENT III
The trial court properly denied prejudgment interest.
This Court and the Supreme Court have recently provided
clear requirements for the awarding of prejudgment interest in
equity cases.

In Shoreline Development v Utah County, 835

P.2d 207 (Utah App. 1992), this court held that the
determinative factor in awarding prejudgment interest is
whether the damages upon which prejudgment interest is sought
can be calculated with mathematical certainty.

In Bellon v.

Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089, 1097 (Utah 1991) the Supreme Court,
quoting Fullmer v Blood, 546 P.2d 606, 610 (Utah 1976) stated:
...No case has been cited to us where we have allowed
prejudgment interest in an action such as the instant
case, which is for equitable relief. "A suit of this
nature... invokes consideration of the principles of
equity which address themselves to the conscience and
discretion of the trial court." In view of the highly
equitable nature of this action where the court has
discretion in determining the amount, if any, to be
[awarded to the Plaintiff], we find no error in the
denial of prejudgment interest.
As in Shoreline, Bellon, and Fullmer, in the present
case, a determination had to be made by the court, of the
value of the benefit received by the Nelsons.

Under the facts

of this case, it would have been impossible to determine the
amount owed with any mathematical certainty.

Not only did

Devon D. provide differing amount owed (ranging from
$56,250.76 to $125,000) at different times before trial, but
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at trial Devon D. began modifying the amounts it claimed were
owed after reviewing its exhibits and acknowledging that many
of them did not apply to Nelsons.

It was also based upon the

discretion of the court that the court decided to use the
amounts paid by Devon D. as the basis for determining the
benefit bestowed, instead of requiring an analysis of the
value of the increased value to the Nelson property.

Until

such a formula for calculating the benefit was adopted,
neither party had a basis to determine what the value of the
benefit to the Nelsons was.
Ultimately all money judgments are determined in specific
monetary amounts to which an interest formula can be applied
with certainty, however, by its very nature, this case did not
provide either party or the court with the ability to
determine the amount of damages with mathematical certainty
before the application of certain equitable principles by the
court.
CONCLUSION
Based on the evidence provided at trial, it was proper
for the court to exclude from its calculations of damages
those exhibits for which it could have determined no benefit
was provided to Nelsons.

Based on recent case analysis of the

awarding of prejudgment interest on

equitable claims, was

appropriate for the trial court to deny prejudgment interest.
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
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Douglas R. CROUSE, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Audrey CROUSE, Defendant and Appellee.
No. 900499-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Sept 11,1991.
Husband brougfa pKtirmtorro
The Third District Court, Salt
LakeCounty, Kenneth Rigtrup, J., denied the r^dtk^ and husband appealed. TheCourtof Appeals, Russon, J.,
held that (l)trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to modrfy aistody, and (2) wife was entitledtoher
attorney's fees, both at trial and on appeal.
Affirmed and remanded.

1.

DIVORCE k312.6(7)
134 —
134VI Custody and Support of Children
1341612 Appeal
134k312.6 Review
134k312.6(7) Questions of tact
Utah App. 1991.
Court of Appeals wifl not disturb trial court'sfindingsof fact on a petition to nralifydivore
change of custody unless they are clearly erroneous.

DIVORCE kl84(4)
134 —
134IV Proceedirgs
1341V(0) Appeal
134kl84
Review
134kl84(4) Presumptions.
[See headnote text below]
DIVORCE kl84(10)
134 —
1341V Proceedirgs
134IV(0) Appeal

134kl84
Review
134kl84(6)
Questions of Fact, Verdcts, and Findings
134kl84(10)
Findings of court or chancellor.
OahApp. 1991.
Party seeking to overturn trial court'sfindingsof to on tKdtm to modify divorce d e a ^ has burden of
marshalling evidence in support of findings arri then demonstrating that, despite s u ^
lacking in support as to be against clear weight of evidence and, thus, clearly erroneous.

3.

DIVORCE k312.6(3)
134 —
134VI O i s t o d y a r r i S u r ^ of Children
134k312 Appeal
134k312.6 Review
134k312.6(3) Presumptions.
UtahApp. 1991.
Court of Appeals would assume correctness of trial court's findings of to in denvinghus^
modify divorce decree as to change of custody, where husband had neither marshalled evidence in support of trial
court's findings nor demonstrated that suchfindingswere dearly erroneous, but merely only cited evidence that
supported outcome he desired.

4.

DIVORCE kl84(5)
134 —
134IV Proceedings
134IV(0) Appeal
134kl84
Review
134kl84<5)
Discretion of court
UtahApp. 1991.
Trial court's decision concerning modification of divorce decree will not be disturbed absent abuse of
discretion.

5.

DIVORCE k303(4)
134 —
134VI Custodyand Support of Children
134k303 Modification of Order, Judgment,OTDecree as to Custody
134k303(4) Discretion of court
UtahApp. 1991.
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in basing its refusal to modify divorce decree as to change of custody on
lack of substantial change inrirormstanceswithout reachir^
there were no
exceptional criteria such as initial custody award premised on temporary condition, chaice between marginal
custody arrangements, or default decree, and court did receive evidence on best interests of child.

6.

DIVORCE k303(2)

134 —
134VI Custody and Support of CWkten
134k3Q3 Modification of Order, Judgment, or Decree astoCustody
134k303(2) Grounds.
UtahApp. 1991.
Husband was not entitled to modify divorce 0*60^toefito(±ar^ of aistcidy on basis that chiktaai bad
recently spent almost equal time with each patent, te children had staited school, thtf
impairment, and that husband had moved n ^ apartment into house; wife's generosily supported leaving primary
physical custody with her, tact that ctakhm had started schod did nrtind^
inthatkwaswithmcoaemplatkjnofpar^
impairment was appropriate groundforchange of custody.

7.

DIVORCE k223
134 —
134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of Property
134K220 Allowance for Counsel Fees and Expenses
134k223
Discretion of court
[See headnote text below]

7.

DIVORCE k227(l)
134 —
134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of Property
134k220 Allowance for Counsel Fees and Expenses
134k227
Amount
134k227(l) In general.
UtahApp. 1991.
Decision to award attorney fees in divorce cases and amouit of such iees are within scunddisaeto
court. U.C.A.1953,30-3-3.

8.

DIVORCE k3121/2
134 —
134VI Custody arri Support of Childien
134k3121/2 Costs.
UtahApp. 1991.
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneyfeestowife en husbairl's petitiontomodity
divorce as to change of custody; trial court refused to modify custody, award was based on profler by wife's
attorney as to his hourly rate, estimated number of hours worked, and travel expenses, wife only had part-time job
and husband'sfinancialstate indicated that he was abletopay the fees. U.C.A. 1953,30-3-3.

DIVORCE k3121/2
134 —
134VI Custody and Support of Children

134k3121/2 Costs.
UtahApp. 1991.
Wife would be awarded her attorney fees on appeal by husband of his petition to modify divorce decree as to
custody; trial court refused to modify oistocfy and awarded wife attcxney
trial court's rulirgs. U.C.A. 1953, 30-3-3.
Page 817 P.2d 837 follows
Kathleen McConkie (argued), Kesler & Rust, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant
David S. Dillon (argued), Rilling & Associates, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellee.
Before BILLINGS, ORME and RUSSON, JJ.
RUSSON, Judge:
Plaintiff, Douglas R. Crouse, appeals from an oider denyirg his petitim
change of custody. We affirm the trial court's ruling, but remard for a detemination of reasonable a t ^ ^
be awarded defendant on appeal.
FACTS
Douglas and Audrey Crouse were married December 6,1984. On March 31,1987, Mr. Crouse filed a
complain for divorce, and on June 1,1988, the Ctouses stipulated to an uncortest^
The divorce decree
provided for joint legpl custody of the Crouses' two children, with primary physical custody being granted to Mrs.
Crouse.
On June 14,1989, Mr. Crouse filed a petition to modify the divorce decree, seeking primary physical custody
of the children on the basis of a substantial d i a r ^ mCTOimstancesw
required a change in custody. At a hearing on the petition, Mr. Crouse offered the folfowirgm support of his
petition: (1) He has moved fiom an apartment into a house; (2) the children have recently spat almost equaltime
with each parent; (3) the children have started school; (4) One child, B., has a speech impediment; and (5) the
custody evaluation of Dr. Gary Taylor, D.S.W., recommended that Mr. Crouse be given primary physical custody
of the children.
Following the hearing, the trial court denied Mr. Crouse's petition, holding that Mr. Crouse had not presented
sufficient evidence to show a substantial change in circumstances, and, in addition, awarded attorney fees to Mis.
Crouse. Mr. Crouse
P&ge 817 P.2d 838 follows
appeals, raising the following issues: (1) Was there sufficient evidence to support, the trial court's finding of no
substar^cto^inciraimstances? (2) Did the trial courterr in denying Mr. Cteuse's petition on the basis of that
findir^? (3) Did the trial, court abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees to Mrs. Crouse? Mrs. Crouse seeks
attorney fees on appeal.
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
[1][2][3] Appellate review of the sufficient of the evidence focuses m

We

will not disturb suchfindingsunless diey are clearly erroneous. Hagqn v. Hagsn, 810 P.2d 478,481 (Utah
App.1991) (dtir^ Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249,1251 (Utah App.1989)); see also Utah RCiv.P. 52(a). The
party seeking to overturn the trial court'sfindingshas the burden of marshaliqg the evidence in support of tte
findings and then demonstrating that, despite such evidence, ttefindingsare so lacking in support as to be against
tte clear weight of tte evidence and, theiefoie, clearly enoneous. Hagan, 810P.2dat481; see also Riche v.
Rkte,784P.2d465,468 (Utah App.1989). "If tte appellantfoilsto marshal tte evidence, tte appellate court
assumes that tte record supports diefindingsof die trial court and proceeds to a review of die accuracy of die
tower court's conclusions of law and die application of diat law in die case." Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198,
199 (Utah 1991) (per curiam) (citations omitted). In die case at bar, Mr. Ctouse has neidier marshaled die
evidence in support of tte trial court9 sfindingsnor cbmonstraled that suchfindingsare clearly erroneous, citing
instead only te evidence that supports die outcome he desires. Thus, we assume die correctness of die trial court's
findings and proceed to review its conclusions of law.
H. REFUSAL TO MODIFY
[4] A trial court's decision concerning modification of a divorce decree will not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion Hagan v. Hagsn, 810 P.2d 478,481 (Utah App.1991) (citir^ Myers v. Myers, 768 P.2d 979,984
(Utah App. 1989)). Moreover, "[i]t is die burden of die party seeld^
demonstrate thattiierehas been a s u b s ^
Walton v.
Walton, 814 P.2d 619,621 (Utah App.1991) (dtmg Hagan, 810 P.2d at 482).
Mr. Crouse argues diat Emer v. Emer, 776 P.2d 599 (Utah 1989), requires die trial court to base its ruling
on die best interests of die children, and, therefore, die trial court abused its discretion in basing itsrefusalto modify
the oistody arrangementOTtte la± of a subs^
We disagree.
[5] In Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51,53 (Utah 1982), tte Utah Supreme Q)urt devdoped a tw(H»
to obtainii^ a charge of custody. The party seeking modification must (1) establish that there has been a
substantial change in drcumstances occurring subsequent to die divorce, and (2) after showing a substantial change,
fiirdiershowtiiatdiecha^ofaistocfyismdK
See also Becker v. Becker. 694 R2d
608 (Utah 1984). The <xurt later qualified
involving a noditigated custody decree, a trial court, in applying die changed drcumstances test, should receive
evidence on changed drcumstances and diat evidence may inch^
tiiediM." Etarer, 776P.2dat605 (en^fcasisadded); seeajto.Mau^ianv. Maughan, 770P.2d 156,160(Utah
App.1989). The HqggerBecker rule was tempered in Emer because "'[t]oori
would lode a child into die custody of one parert or die otfier where there has b ^
of parenting ability of either parent and custody has been awarded only because of die default of one parent in
feflir£tooppose die complaint of die otf*r.'" Elmer, 776 P.2d at 603 (quotirg Kramer v. Kramer, 738P.2d
624,629 (Utah 1987) (Howe, I , cemmirg)).
We recently clarified die Emer rule, noting diat Elmer did not replace die HoggetBecker test widi a new test
requiring the trial court to lode solely at die best
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interests of die child. Walton, 814 P.2d at 621. As we explained m Walton,JHmer merely p e m i ^
incorporating evidence concemir^ die best interests of dE
custody cases; it did not compel die trial courttotake such evidence in every case. Id. at622n.2. Accordingly,
it was not an abuse of discretion for die trial courttobase its refusal to change custody on AE lack of a substantial

change in circumstances without reachir^ the issue of the best irrterests of tte
Moreover, the trial court's ruling is especially appropriate here because of the absence of exceptional criteria
such as an initial custody award premised on atemporarycondition, a choice between marginal custody
arrangements, or a default decree. Maughan, 770 P.2d at 160. Nor is this a case where the refusal to change
custody will result in "the cortimation of custody in a pared; who is indifferent to, or even destructive of, the
child's welfare." Hmer, 776 P.2d at 604. Moreover, in the present case, although the trial court did not base its
decision on the best interests of the children, k did receire evidence m
to
The trial judge heard testimony
as to the children's best interests from not only both parents, but also from Dr. Gary Taylor, D.S.W., who
perfoimed a custody evaluation concraiirg tte Ctouses'dbildren. Taylortestifiedthat both parents are good
parents, that the children love and have bonded with both parents, arid that his decism to recom
Crouse be given primary physical custody was a judgment call. Thus, leaving the children in Mrs. Crouse's care,
which fosters stability, does not leave ten in the hands of someone who is indifferent to or destructive of their
welfare.
[6] Additionally, "we reiterate that the high threshold established in Hpgge was set forth 'to protect the child
from "ping-pong" custody awards and the accompanying instability so damaging to a child's proper development'
" Walton, 814 P.2d at 622 (citir^ Maughan, 770 P.2datl60). Here,Mr. Q o u s e s e e k s a c h ^ o f a i s t o d y o n
the basis that the children have recently spent alnrcst equal time with each parent; that the children have started
sdiool; that one child, B., has a speech in^sediment; and that he has moved from an apartment into a house.
First, the feet that Mrs. Crouse has been generous in sharing physical custody with Mr. Crouse is not a ground to
change physical custody; if anything, it supports leaving primary physical custody with Mrs. Crouse, as it shows
that she has lived up to Aere^nsibilitiesofaaistodMpareit Secondly,the feet that the children have started
sdiool does not indicate a substantial change in circumstances because only dianges not contemplated by the parties
at the time of divorce are relevant to the substantial change test Jense, 784P.2datl251. It was undoubtedly
within the cortemplation of the Ctouses at thetinreof divorce th^
NorhasMr.
Crouse shown that B.'s speech impediment is an appropriate grou^
As to this matter,
Mr. Crousemerely testified that there are ikalities to aid B. with his spee± problem m
Therewas
no evidence that B.'s problem could not also be treated in Scofield. Thus, Mr. Crouse has not shown that B.'s
speech impediment constitutes a substantial change in circumstances. (FN1)
Lastly, to allow Mr. Ctousetoobtamprimaiyphys^
moved ficm an apartment to a house, would open the door for Mrs. Crouse to petition to re^nodify the custody
arrangements if she obtained more comfortable housing arrangements than Mr. Crouse, thus promoting, not
inhibiting "ping-pong" custody. Furthermore, we have previously held that a noncustodial parent's change in
housing arrangements
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from an apartment to a house is generally not sufficient to justify a m c ^ ^
See Wahoa 814 P.2d
at 622. Therefore, the trial court clearly did not abuse its discretion in refusir^ to modify
ffl. ATTORNEY FEES AT TRIAL
[7] Additionally, Mr. Crouse appeals the trial court's award of attorney fees to Mrs. ^
Utah Code Ana
Sec. 30-3-3 (1989) grants trial courts the power to award attorney fees in divorce cases, which award must be
based on evidence of the reasonableness of the requested fees, as well as thefinancialneed of the receiving spouse,
anltte ability of tte other spouse to pay. Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489,493 (Utah App.1991) (citing Rasband v.

Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331,1337 (Utah App. 1988)). Both tte decision to award attorney fees ani Ite amount of
such fees are within tte sound discretion of the trial court M. (citiig Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380,1384 (Utah
1980)).
[8] In the case at bar, thetrial court awarded Mrs. Crouse $2,500 m attorn^
This figure was based on a
proffer by Mrs. Crouse's attorney as to his hourly rate, estimated number of hours waked, and travel expenses.
Mr. Crousedid not argufc the reasonableness of tte fees below, nor does he so argue here. The evidence that Mrs.
Ctouse has (xify a part^in^
Furthermore, evidenceofMr.
Crouse'sfinancialstate shows that he is able to pay thesefees. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in awarding attorney fees to Mrs. Crouse.
IV. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
[9] Mrs. Crouse also seeks an award of attorney fees onappeal. " 'Ordinarily, when fees in a divorce have
been awarded below to the parly who then prevails on appeal, fees will also be awarded to that party on appeal.'"
Befl v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489,494 (Utah App.1991) (quotirg Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166,1171 (Utah App.1990)).
In Ihe present case, Mrs. Crouse was properly awards
Mr.
Crouse offers no reason why the general rule should not be applied here, and therefore we award Mrs. Crouse
attorney fees on appeal.
CONCLUSION
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in: (l)hdding that tee had been no substantial change in
tircumslances which would justify modificatm of tte
referencetothe children's best interests; and (2) awarding attorney fees to Mrs. Crouse. Accordingly, we affirm
the trial court's ruling and, in addition, award Mrs. Crouse attorney fees on appeal in an an^xEltobedetennined
by the trial court on remand.
BILLINGS, J., a m i r s .
ORME, J., concurs in tte result

FN1. Moreover, even if B. 's speech impediment cannot be treated in Scofield, Ite remedy is not a petition to
modify tte original divorce decree as to custody. If tte parties are unable to ancricabfy arrange for B. to receive
treatment, Mr. Crouse's remedy is to file a motion for atemporarycharjge of custody or a motion for a change of
visitation privileges for tte period of time which B. needs for treatment.

Utah Reporter, 155^868 P.2d
840P.2d796, Saurxlers v. Sharp, (Utah App. 1992)
Copyright (c) West Publishing Co. 1994 No claim to original U.S. Govt wories.
P ^ 840 P.2d 796 follows
Leon H. SAUNDERS; Robert Felton; Saunders Land Investment
Coqxxation; White Pine Ranches; White Pine
Enterprises; Kenneth R Norton, d/h/a
Interstate Ratals, Inc.,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
v.
John C. SHARP and Geraldte Y. Sharp, Defendants and
Appellees.
No. 88071OCA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Oct 14,1992.
Purchasers brought action for specific performance against vendors, seeking conveyance of property paid for.
Vendors courterdaimed fix foreclosure. The District Court, Salt Lake Ctourty, J. DennisFredai±, J., d m ^
specific perfomiaixe and grari^
Purchasers appealed. The Court of Appeals, 793 P.2d
927, affirmed judgmer* on a x t e t t Granting purchasers' petition fir writ of certkxaii fe Supren^ C b ^
P.2d 198, held that appellate court foiled to analyze law applicabfe to case arri
The Court of Appeals,
Garff, J., held that (1) purchasers were entitled to release of property, notwilhstandirg their f a t e
theproperty; (2) purchasers were not entitled to release d property whkft they had not paki for, (3)date
purchasers tendered payment establish^ purchasers'equi^^
specified documents
such condition precedent did not
aflfectpurchaser' vested interest; (4) purchasers were rot ertitled to beneft^
and(5)both
purchasers and vendors were entitled to payment of SGDC of their attorney's fees.
Affimed in part, reversed and remanded in par*.

1.

APPEAL AND ERROR k842(2)
30
—
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Bdent, m General
30k838
Questions Considered
30k842
Review Dependent en Whether Questions Are
3Gk842(2)
Findings of feet and conclusions of law.
Utah App. 1992.
Where trial court's "findings of feet" ore actually Conclusions of law, Court of Appeals will review than as
such regardless of how they are captiocwrl

2.

APPEAL AND ERROR k842(8)
30
—
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in Gereral
30k838
Questkms (Considered
30k842
Review Dependent on Whether Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30kS42(8)
Review where evidence consists of documents.
[See headnote text below]

2.

CX)NIRACrSkl76(2)
95
—
9511 Construction and Operation
9511(A) General Rules (>f Construction
95kl76
Questions IOT Jury
95kl76(2)
Ambiguity in general.
UtahApp. 1992.
Wheflier an ambiguity exists in a contract preserts questionoflaw, v^ik^Cburt of Appeals wifl review
independently.

3.

EVIDENCE k397(l)
157 —
157X1 Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting Writings
157XI(A) Contradicting, Varying, or Adding to Terms of Written Instrument
157k397
Contracts in General
157k397(l) In general.
UtahApp. 1992.
If contract is not ambiguous, Court of Appeals wiQknk only at documentsflunselvesarriwill r x t k ^
extrinsic evidence to determine parties' inert.

4.

APPEAL AND ERROR k842(8)
30
—
30XVI Revfcw
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in General
30k838
Questions Considered
3Gk842
Review Dependent on Whether Questions Are of LaworofFact
30k842(8)
Review where evidence consists of documents.
UtahApp. 1992.
A trial court's instruction of contract is an issue of law, both at trial and on appeal, and, thus, Court of
Appeals will review as matter of law whether contract is ambiguous.

5.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER kl59
400 —

400IV Performance of Contact
400IV(B) Conveyance
400kl59
Eflfectofde&ukordelay.
Utah App. 1992.
Absent provision to the contrary, in conditional sales contacts for real property which clearly provide for
transfer of clear tide to part of property upon payment of specified sums as set fo
transferred even when request is made after coitract was in default

6.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE kl33
358
—
358IV P r o c e e d ^ aril Relief
358kl33 Appeal.
UtahApp. 1992.
In determining whether court appropriately granted or denied specific performance of contract for sale of real
estate, Court of Appeals will consider whether intent of parties is clear as to essential tarns of agreement, constnie
partial release clauses mote strongly against seller, and whether, and at what point, right to release vested.

7.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER k50
400 —
400II Cbnstnctm and Opera
400(50
Construing instruments together.
UtahApp. 1992.
Documents comprising real estate sales codract must be construed t p g e t e

8.

MORTGAGES k299
266
—
266VII Payment or Performance of Condition, Rdease, and Satisfection
269(299 Performance of particular conditions.
UtahApp. 1992.
Purchasers' failure to pay taxes on property did rwt excuse vendore'duly to rrfease fe
rote and trust deed provkfed
te
provision in real estate installment sales cortrart
timefy tax payments.

9.

therewasno

MORTGAGES k299
266
—
2 6 6 W Payment or Performance of Condition, Release, and Satisfectm
266k299 Pfcrfomianceofpaitkiilara
UtahApp. 1992.
Vendors' obligation fo release lot from trust deed was not excused by purchasers' nonpayment of taxes, even
though the purchasers' breaches of parties' installment cortract fra
preceded their request for reconveyance of the lot; land had not as yet been foreclosed upon, there wasno

reqpjiremert that purchases specificallyreqpjestand idCTtify lots fcr release, and purchases had made paymat fcathek*.

10.

APPEAL A N D ERROR k842(2)
30
—
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in General
30k838
Questions Considered
30k842
Review Dependent on Whether Questions Are of LaworofFact
30kS42(2)
Findings of fact and conclusions of law.
UtahApp. 1992.
Whether a particular breach of contract is material is conclusion of law to be reviewed independently.

11.

CONTRACTS k211
95
—
950.
Construction and Operation
9511(D) Place and Tare
95k211
Time as of the essence of the contract
UtahApp. 1992.
m installment contracts, courts look to four c ^
makes time of the essence in completing a given duty.

12.

VENDOR A N D PURCHASER k86
400
—
400HI Modification or Rescission of Contract
400ffl(A) By Agreement of Parties
400k86
Abandonment of rights.
UtahApp. 1992.
Refusal of vendors to convey a lot and roadway constituted substantial breach of real estate installment sales
contract so as to materially impair vendor's ability to rxrform ard to corlirue makirg
unplatted property, justifying abandonment of contract

13.

VENDOR A N D PURCHASER k86
400
—
400HI Modification or Rescission of Contract
400HI(A) By Agreement of Parties
400kS6
Abandonment of rights.
UtahApp. 1992.
Vendors' refusal to corrvey poperty which purchasers liad paid for constituted subslartial breach
installment sales contract, impairing purchaser's ability to continue making installment payments on the property,
ard justifying abandonment of the contract; thus, purchasers were not liable for i i r f ^ installment r«ymerts, but
had no right to property for which they had not paid.

14.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER kl85
400 —
400IV Performance of Contract
400IV(D) Payment of Purchase Money
400kl85
Efiectofdeiaultordelay.
UtahApp. 1992.
Purchasers were not entitledtoany portion of uriplatted acres under installment a ^ ^
property, where purchasers hadfoiledtomake an installment payment, and on date of requestforrelease of
property, purchasers were in defaultfortwo years of property taxes, portion of inslallmertp^
yearly installment payment

15.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER k53
400 —
400II QxKtructmandOperatkmofQxlract
400k53 Executory cr executed contracts.
UtahApp. 1992.
Date purchasers tendered payment under installment real estate sales contract established purchasers' equitable
interest in roadway, even though recording of specified documents was condition precedenttotrustee's execution of
release; such ccofttm precedent did not aflect purchasers'vested irierest

16.

DAMAGES kll7
115 —
115VI Measure of Damages
115VI(Q Breach of Contract
115kll7
Mode of estimating damages in general.
UtahApp. 1992.
m awarding damagesforbreach of contract, court will atlemrXtoplaceroixeachingpartyinasgooda
position as if contract had been performed.

17.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE kl27(l)
358 —
358TV Proceedings and Relkf
358kl25 RefefAwarded
358kl27
Attemative, Additional, or Inckiental FJquitable Relief
358kl27(l)
In general.
UtahApp. 1992.
When specific performance is in order, purchaser may be ertitled to an award of lost rer^
vendor may be entitled to interest on purchase money withheld by purchaser.

18.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER k351(8)
400 —

400Vn RemedEs of Purchaser
400VII(B) Actions for Breach of Contract
400k351
Damages
400k351(8)
Damages fir loss of bargain
UtahApp. 1992.
Purchasers did not suffer benefit of the bargain damages due to M i r e of vendois to timely release property
under real estate installment safes contract; purchasers' damages were too remote, conjectural and speculative, and
purchasers failed to establish actual damages; moreover, vendors did not interfere with purchasers' possessionof
property.

19.

APPEAL AND ERROR k842(6)
30
—
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in General
30k838
Questions Considered
30k842
Review Dependent on Whether Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(6)
Admissibility andreceptionof evidence.
[See headnote text below]

19.

APPEAL AND ERROR k842(8)
30
—
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in General
30kS38
Questions Considered
30k842
Review Dependent on Whether Questions Are of Laworof Fact
30k842(8)
Review where evidence consists of documents.
UtahApp. 1992.
Trial court's construction of prior opinion and its attendant deciskxi to bar a&
questions of law which Court of Appeals would review for correctness.

20.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER k351(l)
400
—
400VII Remedies of Purchaser
400VII(B) Actions fee Breach of Contract
400k351
Damages
400k351(l)
In general.
UtahApp. 1992.
Purchasers were not entitled to damages fir interest paid for construction bare for improvemer^
expenditures for construction interest on land purchasers were entitled to was not damages, and expenditures for
land it did not own and was not entitled to was too speculative to be recoverable.

21.

COSTS kl94.32

102 —
102VIII Attorney Fees
102kl94.24 Particular Actions or Proceedings
102kl94.32 Contracts.
[See headnote text below]
21.

COSTS k252
102 —
102X On Appeal or Error
102k252 Attorney's fees on appeal or error.
[See headnote text bebw]

21.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE kl34
358 —
3581V Proceedings and Relfef
358kl34 Costs.
UtahApp. 1992.
Provisions in written contracts providingforpayment of attorney fees shouklordnariryte
attorney fees incurred on appeal and attorney fees incurred in seeking specific performance.

22.

COSTS kl94.36
102 —
1G2VHI Attorney Fees
102kl94.24 Particular Actions or Prtxeedings
lG2kl94.36 Vendor and purchaser, sales.
UtahApp. 1992.
Vendors were not entitled to attorney'sfeesexpended in seekingforeclosureforMire of purchaserstotimely
pay taxes, even though contract providedforpayment of attorney's fees; such was not a remedy that was a right
arising out of breach or default of real estate installment sales contract

23.

COSTS kl94.36
102 —
1Q2VHI Attorney Fees
102kl94.24 Particular Actions or Proceedings
102kl94.36 Vendor and purchaser, sales.
UtahApp. 1992.
Vendors were entitled to attorney'sfeesexpended in their pirreuit of purcrasers for unpaid taxes, such was a
right arising out of real estate installment safes contract and contract provided that defaulting party pay all expenses
of enforcement of breach or default

24.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE kl34

358
—
358IV P r o c e e d ^ and Relief
358kl34 Costs.
UtahApp. 1992.
Purchasers' suit for specific performance was ri^bt arising from vendors' breach of real estate installment sales
contract, and, thus, vendors were entitled to attorney's fees expended for specific performance, where contract
provided that defaulting party pay all expenses of enforcement of breach or default

25.

TRUSTS k368
390
—
390VII Establishm^anlEnforcenet of Trust
390VH(Q Actions
390k368
Injunction.
UtahApp. 1992.
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in entering temporaryrestrainiqgorder to prevent a trustee's sale of
property which was subject of installment contract for sale of real property, notwithstanding breach of contract by
purchasers; purchasers were entitled to release of parts of the propoty notwithstandirg their breadiL
P&ge 840 R2d 798 follows
Robert M. Anderson, G k n D . Watkins (argued), Bryce Wycoff, Hansen & Anderson, Salt Lake City, for
Saunders, Felton, and White Pine.
Marie H. Anderson, Marifyrm P. Fmeshriber, Patricia L. LaTulippe, Nielsen & Senior, Salt Lake City, for
appellees.
John B. Andason (argued), Anderson & Holland, Salt Lake City, for appellant Norton
Stanford B. Owen, Patrick L. Anderson, Fabian & Oendenin, Salt Lake City, for Surety.
Before GARFF, JACKSON aril ORME, JJ.
OPINION
GARFF, Judge:
This case originated as an appeal from fee trial cxjurt'snilirgmfev^
Sharp and
GeraldineY. Sharp, wherein the court lukd that appellaris ( c o l l e t
White
Pine appealed. This court aflBrmedin part, reversed in part, andremandedthe case to the district cxw^ Saunders
v. S h i p , 793 P.2d 927 (Utah App.1990). On certiorari, the Utah Supreme Court agreed that the Utah Court of
Appeals correctly affirmed the trial court's findings on the basis that White Pine foiled to marshal the evidence.
Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198,199 (Utah 1991) (per curiam). However, the supreme court, in its per curiam
opinion, concluded the court of appeals ened when ft "automatically a f f i n ^
Id. Ihe supreme
P&ge £10 P.2d 799 follows
court thereupon remanded the case to the court of appeals to specifically review the district court's interpretation of
the contract and its conclusions of law. M. at200.

FACTS
We reiterate the iactual statement cortained m the opinkm of tofc
court's findings. Saurriers, 793 P.2d 927,928-30 (Utah App.1990). On November 9,1980, White Pine, together
with others not parties to this action, agreed to purchase 60.078 acres of unimproved real property (Property) in
White Pine Canyon, Snyderville, Summit County, Utah from Sharps for the purpose of developing twelve to
fifteen four- to five-acre residential lots.
At the closing of the sale on July 16,1981, the parties executed a "Memorandum of dosing Temis" (Closing
Memorandum), a Trust Deed Note of $963,055.30, a Trust Deed, arri ^
Contract). Sharps' counsel prepared these documents. Appellants Leon H. Saunders, Robert Klton and Kenneth
R. Norton executed toe Contract for the htyers, and Shar^ executed it for ttiesellas.
White P t e agreed to pay Sharps $1,583,055.30 for the Property, $620,(X».(X) of whk^ was paid as a dow^
payment at closing. Pursuant to the Trust Deed Note, White Pine agreed to pay Sharps toe remaining $963,055.30
in five annual installments, in which the principal amount of each installment would be $192,611.06, in addition to
accrued interest on toe entire unpaid balance. At closing, Sharps conveyed fee title to the property to White Pine
subject to the Trust Deed securing payment of the Trust Deed Note. The Trust Deed, by its terms, transferred title
to toe trustee, Associated Title, pending completion of the obligations of toe Contract
The Closing Memorandum noted
1 . . . . after recordation ofthe PUD (FN1) Plat ar^
Restrictions, and upon i ^
payment money), Sella- shall execute and deliver to Buyer a Partial Deed of Reconveyance for one (1) PUD
lot

2. Upon toe payment of the release prioe, Buyer shall be entitled to toe release of one (1) lot of Buyer's
choice upon receipt of toe payment or at any time thereafter.
3. ft is agreed that at toe time of execution of this Memorandum, Buyer has paid to Sella* toe sum of
$620,000.00 which will release from toe Deed erf Trust three (3) PUD lots. l ^ t o s r e c o d a t m o f t t e P U D
Plat and Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions with the Summit County Recorder, Buyer shall
be entitled to toe release from the Deed of Trust of three (3) PUD lots of Buyer's choice together with toe said
roadway.
The Closing Memorandum provided that k "rmy not be oralfy changed, m o d ^
writing, by the party against whom toe same is sought to be enforced." In addition, toe Trust Deed Note and toe
Trust Deed provided that- White Pine would "pay at feast 10 days before delinquent all taxes and assessment
aflfecting said properly." These documents also cortained provisions relating to the payment of attorney fees under
specified conditions.
QnJune30,1982, White Pine paid Sharps an installn^
letter from Feteon, who was also counsel for While Pine, stating, "Upon final plat approval, we will notify you to
obtain toe releases for toe lots and the road as per toe contract"

The foltowir^ year, on June 28 and Jure 30,1983, White Pine paid Sharps $178,165.23. Tteremainir^
portion of the June 30,1983 installment payment was p ^
resulting in a default
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On July 19,1983, while the June 30,1983 payment was still in default and prior to the recordation of a final
plat, Felton wrote a letter to Jon C. Heaton, attorney for Sharps, in which Feltonrequestedthat Sharps release Lots
1 through 5 and the Roadway.
On September 23,1983, a Notice of Defeult was filed pursuant to the Trust Deed on the Property for tte
default of the June 30,1983paymenL WhiteRnecui^thede6dtonNovemba , 14,1983 by tendering
$118,397.39 to Sharps.
On November 18,1983, Heaton sent a letter to his clients (Sharps) enclosirg for their appro\^ a proposed
finalplaL This plat, along with a Declaration of Protective Cbvenarts (Ctovenarts), was lafe
County. While Heaton's letter said nothing about an easemert, fc instnicted Mr. Sharp to
enclosed consent document only acknowledges your approval of [Mr. Saundeis's] recording the plat and the
[Covenants], copy here enclosed." Heaton's letter also noted
By Hy Saunders' signature, which I will obtain to this letter prior to rekasir^ your consert to
of the subdivision plat, he agrees that you cortime to have your right of approval with regflrd to how the
southern portion of the property is platted.
Heatm placed a signature block at the b o t ^
By."
However, Mr. Saunders never signed the letter, nor was it signed by any other appellant who signed the Trust
Deed, the Trust Deed Note, and the Closing Memorandum. Heaton's letter noted that Mr. Saunders intended to
seek a "release of Lots 1 through 5 of the platted subdivision along with the road." Heaton said he had "reviewed
the payments under the Note" and found that Mr. Saunders "is entitled to those releases." Finally, Heaton stated
that once the releases weae made, "pursuant to your instruction we will insure thatrightsare reserved in [the
Roadway] fix access for the southern portions erf the property purchased from you until your Deed of Trust is fully
paid."
The proposed final plat enclosed with Heaton's letter platted only the northern portion of the Property into six
PUD lots, leaving the southern portion (approximately tweity^ven a ^
Cto November 21,1983, Felton, in a letter to Heaton, rejected the idea of aeating an easement in favor of
Sharps along the Roadway and objected to the scope of the accessrightsproposed in Heaton's letter.
On or about November 23,1983, Sharps executed a Consent to Record with respect to White Pine's plat
describing Phase I of the project, \^iidi irwolved the n a A six lots arii te Roadway. The plat and fee Covenants,
along with theConsent to Record, were recorded with the Summit C b ^
The
plat indicated that the internal Roadway was to be private, in contravention to Sharps' intent to have the Roadway
dedicated to public use. The Covenants provided that easements over the lots and common area properties "are
hereby reserved by Declarant [White Pine], together with te right tog
The remainir^ property abutting the Roadway to the south was not platted. The plat showed the existence and

location of utility easements, including those for water lines, a waler tank and water system, substantial portions of
whkft were to be constructed on the u r p ^
White Pine advised Sharps it would plat the balanceofthe
Property at a lata: time.
On November 23,1983, Sharps authorized the recofldirig of a Cancellation of Notice of Default relating to the
June 30,1983 payment
On January 18,1984, Sharps directed the trustee, Associated Tide, to reconvey Lots 1 through 5, but not the
Roadway, ftomthe Trust Deed to White Pine. Sharps instructed that "(ejxeept for |Lots 1 throu^ ^ afl other
portions of the property remain subject to the Trust Deed."
Associated Tide did not prepare the reconveyance of Lots l t ^ ^
The
reconveyance was recorded March 26,1986, more ton two years
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after While Pine had tendered the funds for those lots. No explanation of the deky in prcparirg
was provided at trial.
On November 30,1984, property taxes of approximately $4,725.00 for Lot 6 and the unplatted property
became due and payable. White Pine had paid only $1,515.24 of that sum. White Pine later became delinquent
ontaxesfor 1985,1986 and 1987. The Contract provided that White Pine pay such taxes at least ten days before
delinquency.
White Prepaid the 1984 instalhiKrt payment of $192,611.06. The foflowirg year, onJune27,1985, Sharps
received only a portion of the June 30,1985 installment payment m t e f ^
$59,709.47.
On September 16,1985, Sharps ag3inrecorded a Notice of Default and published Notices of Sale covering
Lots 1 through 5, Lot 6, and the Roadway and all of the unplatted property. Sharps later admitted that they
mistakenly included Lots 1 through 5 m the Notice of Default
In a letter dated February 27,1986, White Pine requested a release of 7.35 acres of fee unplatted acreage.
On May 7,1986, Fdton sent a letter to Sharps noting that the buyers ^vere in a position to prepare and obtain
approval of that plat [for the unplatted acreage] immediately.M
The next month, White Pine defeuSed on the final June 30,1986 installmat.
During these years, Sharps did not interfere with White Pine's attempts to market or sell the Property.
On September 4,1986, the day before the scheduled Trustee's Sale, White Pine sued, claiming Sharps
materially breached the Contact in that they never reconveyed the Roadway, Lot 6 or 7.35 acres of the unplatted
property. White Pine sodght specific perfomiance of the Contract irr
7.35 acresofthe unplatted property, as well as damages arisirg flam Sharps'breach ^
WhitePine
also claimed Sharps' M i r e to reconvey excused White Pine's obligfltionto makefiirtheriretallmer* payments, and
tolled the accrual of interest on the unpaid principal balance.

White Pine also obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) restraining Sharps from conduct^ the Trustee's
Sale. Tte TRO required a bond of $2,400.00. In a hearir^ held January 4,1988, this court ordered that the bond
be increased to $50,000.00 "to protect the Sharps for the payment of such costs and damages as may be inclined
or suffered if the Sharps are found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained."
Sharps defended, daiming they weie exoised fixm reconveyi^
request reconveyances, or alternatively, because the Consert to R ^
thenrourterclaim^
and claimed damages for its wrongful issuance.

Sharps
Sharps sought a dissolution of the TRO

The district court rejected White Pine's claims rulirg to
failing to pay property taxes for Lot 6 and the unplatted acreage on November 30,1984. The court concluded that
White Pinefartherbreached the Contract by failing to ^
Because these
breaches were "material, significant and continuing and were uncured when [White Pine's] releases were first
requested," Sharps were excused ftom reconveying Lot 6, the Roadway and the 7.35 acres. The court found that
any damages claimed by White Pine "are too remote, conjectural and speculative."
The court found that Sharps had substantially complied with all of their obligations undo: the Contract and were
entitled to foreclose and sell Lot 6 and all of the unplatted property because of White Pine's Mure to request and
identify lots for reconveyance. The court based this conclusion on White Pine's actual practice, as well as a
requirement of the Closing Memorandum, to "make specific requests for the release of specific PUD lots ftom the
Sharps."
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The court also concluded, in the alternative, that (1) Sharps' execution of the Consent to Record constituted
substantial performance of aryobligstm to release the Roadway u
(2)Shaips'
refusal to reconvey Lot 6, the Roadway, and the unplatted acreage was done in gpod feitti because they relied on
the advice of their attorney, Heaton; (3) While Pine suffered no damages as a result of Sharps' failure to act; and
(4) based on Heaton's letter, White Pine had granted an easement to Sharps over the Roadway for access to the
unplatted property by the "mutual intent and agreement of the parties." The court concluded that "[a]ccess to the
unreleased and unpaid for land was intended to be given to the [Sharps] in case of default"
The court found that except for $1,515.2* in property taxes pakl on te urplattBd aaeage in 1984, "notaxes
have been paid on die unreleased Subject Property subsequer* to November 30,1984 and including 1985,1986
and 1987."
The court entered judgment agflinst While Pine for $742,984.67 and ordered the property sold at a sheriffs
sale.
White Pine timely appealed. This court affirmedin part, reversed m part, and remanded fec^ to
court Saunders, 793 P.2d at 934. On certiorari, the Utah Supreme Ctourt remanded the case bade to this court to
review flie district court's interpretation of the Cbrtr^
Saunders, 806 P.2d at 199-200.
ISSUES
The questions of law before this court are (1) whether the Gxttact

fc

(2) the extent of White

Kne's liabilily for taxes, and \^iedia- such liability afifects Sharps' oblig^tioii to lelease propaly; (3) whether the
Cortract requires Sharps to recoovey Lot 6; (4) whether White Pine is excused ftom makk^ installmal and
interest payments on tte unplatted property; (5) whether the ContractrequiresSharps to reconvey 7.35 acres of the
unplatted property; (6) whether the CortractrequiresSharps to reconvey the Roadway; (7) whether White Pine is
entitled to benefit of the bargsin damages; (8) whether the court c o n ^ ^
interest; (9) ^iietha" eitha" party is otided to attomey fees incuned at trial and on ^peal; and (10) whether the
court acted within its discretion in issuing the TRO.
[1] This court has already affirmed the trial court'sfindingsof feet Saunders v. Sharp, 793 P.2d 927,931
(Utah App. 1990). The Utah Supreme Court, on certiorari has requested to this
interpretation of the Contract aril itscorriusiansoflaw. Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198,199-200 (Utah 1991)
(percuriam). While wereaffirmthe trial court'sfindingsof feet, we note that wiiere the trial court's "findir^" are
actualfy conclusions of law, we review them as such regsrdkss of how they are captioned. See 50 W. Roadway
Assoc, v. Redevelopment Ageay, 784 P.2d 1162,1171 (Utah 1989).
We first review the lawregflrdingambiguity. We thai examine the lawregsrdingpartialreleasedausesand
apply it to the court's legfll conclusions. The application of these areas of law and the inttaprelation of the Cortract
involve conclusions of law, which we review independently. Saunders, 806 P.2d at 199-200.
I. AMBIGUITY
[2] Language in a cortract is ambiguous "if die words used to express die intent of the parties are insufficient
so to tiiecortractmay be understood to reach two or more plausible meanings." Larson v. Overland Thrift &
Loan, 818 P.2d 1316,1319 (Utah App.1991), cert denied 832 P.2d 476 (Utah 1992). Whether an ambiguity
exists preserts a question of law, which we review irxlependertly. Id. However, the "language of a cortract is not
necessarily ambiguous merely because a party urges a different meaning to is more in accordance with its own
interests." Id.
[3] [4] If a cortract is not ambiguous, we look only at the documents themselves and do not lode at extrinsic
evidence to determine the parties' intent. Wineearv.
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Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104.108 (Utah 1991). A trial court's construction of a cortract is an issue oflaw, both at
trial and on appeal. Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714,716 (Utah 1985). Thus, we review as a matter of law
whether the Cortract is ambiguous and whether itrequiredreconveyanceof the various parcels of the Property.
Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon& Davis Utah, Inc., 777 P.2d 483,486 (Utah 1989).
H. PARTIAL RECONVEYANCE
[5\ Generally, specific performance "may be granted only if the parties' intent as to die essential terms of the
agreement is clear." Barnard v. Barnard, 700 P.2d 1113,1114 (Utah 1985). Where the agreement provides for
partial release of a mortg3ge or trust deed on specific lots or parcels, "it has generally been held to the release
provisions should be interpreted more stror^ against the party required to g i ^
Sears v. Riemersma,
655 P.2d 1105,1107 & n 1 (Utah 1982). Moreover, absent a provision to the contrary, in conditional sales
contracts for real property which clearly provide for transfer of cleartitletopart of the property upon payment of
specified sums as set forth in the c»rtract,titfemust be tran
wasindefeuk. Bunougis v. Gamer, 43 Md.App. 302,405 A.2d 301, 30849(1979); Leisure Campground &

Countty dub Dd. P&rtnersh?) v. Leisure Estates, 280 Md. 220, 372 A.2d595, 598-99(1977); Columbia Dev.,
Inc. v. Watchie, 252 Or. 81,448 P.2d 360, 361-63 (1968). That is, the payment of each inslallmat vests tte
buyer wifo an interest m f e parcel an^
This duty cannot be
retroactively excused, evmwteetebityersubseqioitfydefedts; "... it has no bearing upon the mortgagors'
right torequesta release fe whkiifoilpayment was made prior to default" Burroughs, 405 A.2d at 30809;
Leisure, 372 A.2d at 598-99; Watchie, 448 P.2d at 361-63. This is true even where the buyer has not yet platted
or described the lard, Burroughs, 405 A.2d at 308O9, and where buyer has defkilted on his or her o^
pay taxes on tte land. Watchie, 448 P.2d at 361-63. (FN2)
[6] To sum up, in ctetermining whelher a court appropriately granted or denied specific performance, we
consider whether the intent of the parties is clear as to the essentialtermsof the agreement; we construe partial
release clauses more strongly agsinst the seller, and, we consider whether, and at what point, the right to the
release vested.
ffl. FAILURE TO PAY TAXES
\7] That having been said, we next consider whether White Pine's Mure to pay taxes on November 30,1984
and thereafter excused Sharps' duty to release. We acknowledge that the documents ccmprisir^theGatractmua
be construed together in light of theirpuipose. Adas Corp. v. Oovis Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 225,229 (Utah 1987);
Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City, 740P.2d 1357,1359 (UtahApp.), cert denied 765 P.2d
1277 (Utah 1987).
[8] Neither party disputes that White Pine was obliged to pay taxes on the property. Nor do they dispute that
as of November 30,1984, White Pine failed to comply with that obligation. However, Shaips claim, and the trial
court concurred, that payment of taxes constituted a condition
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precedent toreleaseof the land. On the other hand, White Pine claims this conclusion was kgsl error because tte
Contract did not specify that paymeloftaxeswasacx^nditionprecedert.
Here, the Trust Deed Note and the Trust Deed provide that White Pine would "pay at least 10 days before
delinquency all taxes and assessment affecting said property." Even when we consider this language along with
the three paragraphs in the MemorandumregardingSharps'releaseobligations, we see nothing conditioning
Sharps' duty toreleaseupon White Pine's nrakirg timefy tax payments. Because this language is unambiguous, we
consider only die documents themselves and do not look at extrinsic evidence to determine die parties' intent
Wk*g3r,813P.2datl08.
Sharps cite cases where courts have held that payment of taxes was a condition precedent to release.
Maikowitz v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 651 F.2d 825, 827 (2ni Cir.1981); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v.
Heckmarm, 164 Misc. 234,297 N.Y.S. 592,554-95 (N.Y.Sup.1937); dason's Point Land Co. v. Schwartz, 262
N.Y.S. 756, 759-60 (N.Y.App.Div. 1933). These cases are inapposite either because the underlying contract had a
proxdsionaaEleratir^te
Schwartz; 262
N.Y.S. at 758, or because the "terms of the mortgage precluded [the buyer] from demanding thereleaseof liens so
long as [the buyer] was in defeuk under the mcjrtgsge." Markowitz, 651 F.2d at 827.
The issue hoe is whether the language of the Contract specifies that payment of taxes is "requisite to amble the
other party to carry out his part of the agreement" so as to excuse Sharps'duty to release. Buckman v. Hill

Military Academy, 190 Or. 194,223 P.2d 172,175 (1950) (where buyer had made principle payment, seller
required to release parcel).
Thus, while White Hne is nevertheless liable for taxes, (FN3) that liability in no way undercuts Sharps'
oblig9tion to release property which has been timely paki for p
IV.L0T6
White Pine claims the court erred in condudiqg that Sharps' duty to release Lot 6 was excused by White
Pine's nonpayment of taxes.
[9] The court concluded that because White Pine's "material and continuing breaches of the parties' Contract
preceded timely plaintifls' requests for reconveyance of Lot 6 ... [Sharps] were not obligsted to reconvey Lot 6."
The breachreferredto by the court was White Pine's M i r e to pay taxes on November 30,1984. The court
concluded that While Pine's duty to specifically request and identify lots for release was a condition precedent to
Sharps' duty to release, and that the Closing Memorandum and While Pine's "actual practice" established this duty.
White Pine argues that as of November 30,1984, the date of itsfeilureto pay the taxes, Sharps had already
breached by failing to timely reconvey Lots 1 through 5, the Roadway, and Lot 6. White Pine claims the court
erred in concluding that Sharps' duty to convey would not arise until such t ^
requested it, and that a correct interpretation would fix the date of the duty to convey Lot 6 upon payment of the
installment, in this case, Jime 30,1984. This date arose well before White Pine's November 30,1984 feilure to
pay taxes. Therefore, While Pine claims ^
from paying future installments undo- the Contract until such time as Sharps reconveyed.
The case of Burroughs v. Gamer, 43 Md.App. 302,405 A.2d 301 (1979) is on point Burroughs involved a
similar release clause where die buyers requested release afler they had defaulted on the contract, but before the
land had been foreclosed.
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Unlike the immediate issue, which involves M i r e to pay property taxes, the buyer in Burroughs foiled to pay
principal, interest and taxes. Id. 405 A.2d at 305. After the default, buyers requested release of property for
which they had already tendered payment. Id. at 305-06. The sellers refused to releaseon the basis that buyers
had failed to plat the parcel and torequestit prior to default Id. at 307. The Burroughs court held that because
no provision in the deed disallowed release subsequent to default, and because release was "contemplated to take
place in thefijture[,]"buyers ertitto
Id. at308.
The Burroughs court relied on Leisure Can^ground & Country Qub Lid. Partnership v. Leisure Estates, 280
Md. 220, 372 A.2d 595 (1977). The court in Lrisge held t h a t ^ ^
any way negates the f k i to where M pay^
equitable ownership of the property, and the mortgagee has, at most, only bare legal tide to it" Id. 372 A.2d at
598. In Leisure, the court also held that, so long as the contract specified that the buyer was to select the property
to be reconveyed, failure to describe the property prior to foreclosure would not prevent enforcement of the release
provision:
But, when the lender agrees that whatever the borrower may choose or intend be released will be released, he
also agrees that the lender's intention as to the particular part to be released wifl be considered fe

of the borrower and he should not be heard to say otherwise. The tract chosen under ttiose circumstances by
the borrower js the tract intended.
Id. at 602-03 (quotirg Lambert v. Jones, 540 S.W.2d 256,259 (TenaCt.App.1976)).
In the present case, the trial court concluded that te trans of the Ctortn^ and WhteHne
requirement that White Pine must " s p e c i f i c request and i d ^
This conclusion is neither
supported by the language of the Contract, nor by case law. The only language in the Contract going to White
Pine's duty to request andidentify a parcel prior to release is the following: "Upon the payment of the release
price, Buyer shall be entitled to the release of one (1) lot of Buyer's choice upon receipt of the payment or at any
time thereafter."
In January 1984, Sharps instructed Associated Title to reconvey Lots 1
fa
InJune
1984, White Pine paid its anmal installment of $192,611.06, more than erough to pay for Lot 6 ($140,000.00).
Obviously, under the terms of the agreement, White Pine was entitled to release of Lot 6 when it made the 1984
payment, even though it had notrequestedit because this was the onfy platted lot ro
The trial court's irierpretation misses the "crucial distinction between a vested entitlement to a release ... and
mere conditions placed upon the fomial execution of the release b y t e
Burroughs, 405 A.2d at 309.
Moreover, the Closing Memorandum specifies that White Pine is entitled to release of the property upon Sharps'
receipt of the payment "or at any time thereafter." This language disallows an interpretation that a release
requested after default would be dishonored.
We affirm the court's findings relating to White Pine's oblig3tion to pay property taxes on Lots 1 to 6 and the
Roadway. However, we reverse theccurt's conclusionr^rdirg Sharp'sdiiy to release Lot 6.
V. EXCUSE OF FUTURE INSTALLMENTS
White Pine claims the court erred in holding it lial^ for unpaid installmals. White Pine claims Sharps'Mure
to timely convey Lot 6 and the Roadway excused its withholding of those sums.
"Parties to a contract are obliged to proceed in good faith and to cooperate in the performance of the contract in
accordance with its expressed intent" Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P.2d 140,144 (Utah 1982). Thus, a "party cannot
by wflM act or omission make it impossible or difficult for the other to perfomi and then invoke the other' s
nonperfomiance as a defense." Id.
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On the other hand, when ore
such that it "materially impairs the
contractor's ability to perform, [the other party] has the right to consider the contract at an end, to cease work, and
to recover tte value of the wodc already performed." WagstaflF v. Renrco, Inc., 540 P.2d 931,933 (Utah 1975).
In like manner, "a party committing a substantial breach of a contract cannot mairtam an a ^
other contract^ party ... for a subsequent failure to perfoim if the p
Rogers v. Relyea,
184 Mont 1, 601 P.2d 37,41 (1979).
Cburts have applied the obligstm

See, e.g.. DarrellJ.

Dkiericksen & Sons, Inc. v. Magna Water and Sewer Improvement EtisL, 613 P.2d 1116,1119 (Utah 1980);
Wagstaflf, 540 P.2d at 933. In Wagstaflf, the court acknowledged that "a mere delay of a month by one party in
making a payment on a contract would usually result in damages only, but would not justify the other party in
abandoning the contract" 540 P.2d at 933. The court noted that this general rule varied depending on the
circumstances. Id. The court concluded that "where the failure to pay an installment as provkied m
contract is such a substantial breach that it materially impaire the c o n ^
consider the contact at an aid, to cease work, and to recover the value of the woric aheady performed." W.
Not everyminor M i r e justifies nonperformarre and res^
"ft must be something so
substantial that it could be reasonably deemed to \indicatetheolha^srefiisaltopeifomL" Zion's Properties, Inc.
v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319,1321 (Utah 1975).
The Utah Supreme Court applied this principle to an installment contract wherein one party agreed to pay a
plumber as work progressed. McCanen v. Menill, 15 Utah 2d 179, 389 P.2d 732,733 (1964). InMoCanen,
the court, noting that die defendant refused to make timely payments as established by the contract, held that "die
plaintiff was justified in refusing to complete it." Id.
[10] [11] Whether a particular breach is material is a conclusion of law to be reviewed independently.
Dkiericksen, 613 P.2d at 1119; McCanen, 389 P.2d at 733. More particularly, in inslalln^nt contracts, courts
look to the four comers of the contract to determine whether "the contract by its tarns makes time of die essence"
in completing a given duty. Dkiericksen, 613 P.2d at 1119; McCanen, 389 P.2d at 733.
[12] The essential question, as applied to this case, is whether Sharps' refusal to convey Lot 6 and the
Roadway constituted a substantial breach of the Contract so as to materially impair White Pine's ability to perform
and thus to justify White Pine's a b a n c k m ^
rendered "it diflScuk or impossible for [White Pine] to continue performance and then [attempted to] take advantage
of the noivperfomiance he has caused." Zkxi's Properties, 538 P.2d at 1321.
Hoe, the purchase and conweyarre
tf
White Pine had paid for the
Roadway and Lot 6 by the end of June 1984. Sharps contend White Pine was in cfefeult when it foiled to pay
taxes in November 1984. However, Sharps had a duty to convey the Roadway and Lot 6 in June. Thus, their
refusal to convey constituted a substantial breach of the Contract, impairing White Pine's ability to continue making
installment payments on the urplatted property, thus justify^
[13] We hold that the court ened in holding White Pteliabk for unpaid ins^
property. Likewise, we hold that White Pine has no right to property for which ft has not paii
liability to pay taxes on such property, as we forthff discuss in the next sectioa (FN4)
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VI. UNPLATTED 7.35 ACRES
[14] White Pine challenges the trial court's conclusion that it was not entitled to release of 7.35 acres of
unplatted property. While White Pine's brief is not explicit, its claim seems to be that Sharps'duty to release 5.35
acres arose when it paid the June 30,1984 installment because the p r i r i ^ portion of fliispaymal exceeded the
amount needed to release Lot 6. White Pine claims it then became equi^fy otitled to two more aaes when it
paid $59,709.47 as part ofthe Jure 30,1985 installment Six morths earlier, White Pine had foiled to pay taxes

on the unplatted property, which taxes became due November 30,1984.
The Closing Memorandum provides that "after lmHdation of te
Conditions and Restrictions, and upon receipt of each $140,000.00 in prindpal... Sella- shall execute and deliver to
Buyer a Partial Deed of Reconveyance for one (1) PUD lot" The next paragraph provides that "[ujponthe
payment of the release price, Buyer shall be entitled to the release of one (1) lot of Buyer's choice upon receipt of
the payment or at any time thereafter."
The court's findir^s, which we have already affim^, Saundra ^
App.1990), reveal that White Pine paid only $59,709.47 of tte 1985 installment; it did not pay any of the final
1986 installment; and, White Pine did notrequestthe 7.35 acre parcel urtf February 27,1986, "de^ite the
provision in [the Closing Menwrandum] for the release by the Sharps of 'PUD lots' only." The court found that
as of the date of the request, White Pine was still in default far the 1984 and 1985 property taxes and a portion of
the 1985 installment and tte full 1986 installment
The court made no finding as to what portion of d^ 1985 partM payment was principal arri w ^
interest
More importantly, the Closing Memorandum requires that White Pine must have paid $140,000.00 in
principle above that which was already paid for Lot 6 in order to be equitably entitled to an additional PUD unit
from die unplatted properly. Our examination of the findings and the record reveals to White Pine had not done
so.
Thus, the court conecdy concluded that White Pine was not entitled to a r y p o i t ^
VH. THE ROADWAY
The district court concluded that the Cbnttact pro\ddes that Whte
Roadway to any unrekased and unpaid for land as security in case of defedt by White Pine. The court also
concluded that die parties modified the Contract to provide that owners and purchasers of the unplatted acreage,
including Sharps and their successors in interest, would be entitled to use die Roadway for access to die unplatted
property. The court concluded that this nxxlificatm was "memorialized l y te
evidenced by the part pertbcmance andrelianceof the Sharps on such letters and agreement in executing die
Consent to Record." In die alternative, die court held that die Consent to Record in effect conveyed the Roadway
in compliance with die modification.
White Pine claims die court9 s conclusions constitute legal error because die Contract unambiguously created a
duty for Sharps to release the Roadway in fee simple to White Pine. White Pine argues that Sharps cannot meet
thisrequirementtoreleasetiiroughdie creation of an easem^OTtiirou^ the Ctons^ to Record. White Pine also
claims die court erred in condudir^ that die parties had modified die Cbn^
The Closing Memorandum reveals diat White Pine had paid Sharps $620,000.00. The document provides,
widi our emphases, that upon payment of this sum, and upon "dierecordationof the PUD Plat and Declaration of
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions widi die Summit County Recorder, [White Pine] shall be entitled to die
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release from die Deed of Tmst of diree (3) PUD lots of Buyer's choice togeflier widi die said roadway." The

Closing Memorandum expressfy provides that it "may not be oralfy changed, modified, or terminated, except in
writing, by the party ag9inst whom the same is sought to be enforced."
[15] The plain language of the Closing Memorandum (FN5) unambiguous^ establishes that White Pine's
equitable interest in the Roadway vested on Jufy 16,1981, the date it tendei^ the $620,000.00. Asweeariier
discussed, therecordingof the specified documents was a condition precede to the
release, but didrwtaflfect White Pine's vested interest Burroughs v. Garner, 43 Md.App. 302,405 A.2d 301,
30&O9(1979). Because White Pine's vested irterestin the Roadway arose July 16,1981, the date of the executm
of the Closing Memorandum, its right toreceivedie Roadway would survive any modification or subsequent
breach. Given that thereleasecould not be piactically berealizedurtfl
and the Covenants werefiled,the Burroughs case would allow for the right to vest even though the land had not
yet been platted. Thus the districtrourte n ^
regarding the Roadway. We thereforereversethat conclusion.
Vm. BENEFIT OF THE BARGAIN DAMAGES
While Pine challenges the di
Specifically, White
Pine claims it is entitled to die difference between the purchase price of the property that should have been released
and the fair market value as of the date of Sharps' wrongfulrefusalto release.
[16] In awarding damages for breach of contract, courts attempttoplare
positmasiftheaxtratfhadbe
Alexander v. Blown, 646 P.2d 692,695 (Utah 1982); Keller v.
Deseret Mortuary Q).,23 Utah 2d 1,455 P.2d 197,198(1969). Wh^thecortractrartemplatestim^
payiraiof installm^
... will
attempttoplace the parties in the positm
manr»." Dillir^ham Commacial Co. v. Spears, 641 P.2d 1,10 (Alaska 1982).
[171 This* when specific performance ism order, the buyer may b^
profits, while the seller rmy be etfitled to i r t e ^
Eiasonv.
Watts, 615 P.2d 427,431 (Utah 1980) (citirg Pearce v. IWrd Ave. Improvement Co., 128 So. 396 (Ala.1930)).
[18] Here, the district court found that White Pine's damages were "too remote, conjectural and speculative,"
and that White Pine "Med to establish it [has] suffered actual damages resulting from any alleged teach by
[Sharps]."
This is afindingof feet, which we have previously affirmed. Saunders v. Sharp, 793 P.2d 927,931 (Utah
App.1990). likewise, we have already affirmed thefindingthat Shaips did rrt
possession of the property. Id. Given thesefindings,there is no basis fcr a condusionttiat White Pine sustain
benefit of the bargain damages. Thus, the court correctly declined to mate such a conclusion.
IX. CX)NSTRUOION INTEREST
White Pine claims the court erred in refasir^ to admk evidence of team
company for exxtfruction loans for improvements on the
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property. White Pine obtained these loans after the parties executed the Contract

During trial, Sharps objected to the admission of evidence gpirg to interest on c ^ ^
Thecourt,
relying cm Ranch Homes, Ire. v. Greater Park City Corp., 592 P.2d 620 (Utah 1979) sustained the objection,
presumably because it found the evidence to be irrelevant
[19] The trial court's construction of Ranch Homes and its attendant decision to bar admission of the evidence
present questions of lawwhich we review for correctness. Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d
467,470 (Utah 1989); City of W. Jordan v. Retirement Bd., 767 P.2d 530,532 (Utah 1988).
In Ranch Homes, the developers purchased an o p t m to h ^ thirty aoes of real propaty. Ranch Homes, 592
P.2dat622. After the developers exercised the option, the sellersrepudiatedthe temis of the o p t ^ TheUtah
Supreme Court reversed the trial court's award of damages incurred by the developers prior to their exercise of the
option M. at625-26.
Special damages are "those damages which arise from the special c m ^ ^
They have been
said to be such damages as, by competent evidence, are directly traceable to failu^
obligation." Id. at 624 (footnote omitted). The supreme court emphasized that special damages mustbe
foreseeable at the time of contracting. Id. n Ma^ knowledge of possible hann is ret enough; the defendant must
have reason to foresee, as a probableresultof the breach, the damages claimed. Furthermore, before reliance
damages may be awarded, the amount of the expenditure must be found to have beenreasonablymade." Id.
[20] In the present case, our ruling that White P t e has a vested irterest in Lot 6 but ro
property, along with our affirmance of the court's finding that Sharps did not interfere with White Pine's efforts to
maiket the property, rendersthe evidence irrelevant That is, White Pine's expenditures for construction interest a i
land k is eititled to canrrt
On the other hand, White Pine's expenditures for land it does
not own and is not entitled to is too speculative to be recoverable, especially since it elected to cease making
payments toward that property.
We therefore hold that the court correctly concluded that evidence of i r i e r e s t ^
improvements on the property was irrelevant.
X. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
Each party claims k is c o r t i ^ ^
White Pine claims the trial
court erred as a matter of law inawandir^ Sharps attorney fees because they breadied fe C
White Pine
asserts its contractual right to an award of attorney fees incurred at trial and on appeal.
On theother hand, Sharps claimthe court correctfy awarded attorney fees. They ask this c c m to aflfirm their
award and to award them additional fees on appeal.
While courts may, in some situations, award attorney fees on an equitable basis, "attorneys fees, when
awarded as alfowed by law, are awarded as a matte* of legsl right" Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622,625 (Utah
1985).
One such instance occurs when the right is contractual. (FN6) In such cases, " 'the court does not possess the
same equitable discretion to deny attorney's fees that it has when feshioning equitable remedies, or applying a
statute \ \ t o k h a l t o w s t t e d i s ^
Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 836 (Utah

App.1989) (quotkE Spinks v. Ctevron Cffl Co., 507 F.2d 216,226 (5th Or.1975)).
[21] This, "[p]rovisions in written contracts providing for payment of attorney fees should ordinarily be
honored by the
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courts." Staoey Properties v. Wixen, 766 P.2d 1080,1085 (Utah App.1988), cert denied. 779 P.2d 688 (Utah
1989) (quotirgSoflfev.Rkid, 659 P.2d 1082,1085 (Utahl983)). This includes attorney fees incurred on appeal.
Management Servs. Corp. v. Development Assocs., 617 P.2d 406,40809 (Utah 1980); rcconiRedevelopmert
Agerxy v. Daskalas, 785 P.2d 1112,1126 (Utah App.1989) cert, granted 795 R2d 1138 (Utah 1990).
It also includes attorney fees incurred to seek speriffc perfomnance. HacMari v. Snow, 657 P.2d 1271,1277
(Utah 1982); Jones v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733,736 (Utah 1980); Cm v. E h x h Smith Co., 781 P.2d 1292,1296
(Utah App.1989).
Here, the Contract provision sought to be enfoiced is part of the Closing Memorandum:
Intheevertofbrea±ordefautto^
expenses of enforcing die same or any right arising out of breach or default thereof, including reasonable
attorneys' fees, whether incurred with or without suit and both before and after judgment
Thus, the Contract provides that the defaulting party pay all expenses of enforcement of a breach or default
Here, both parties have defaulted. Thus, each defaulting party must pay reasonatte attorney fees associated with
enforcing each default, including "air/rightarising out of breach or default thereof."
[22] Neither party disputes that White Pine Med to timely pay taxes on Lots 1 to 6 and die Roadway.
However, thedispute arose over the proper remedy for M i r e to pay taxes and instaDmals. Because we conclude
today that Sharps improperly refused to reconvey Lot 6 and die Roadway, we likewise conclude that Sharps may
not collect attorney fees for seeking a remedy that is not a "right arising out of breach or default thereof."
[23] However, Sharps' pursuit of White Pine for unpaid taxes on Lots 1 to 6 and the Roadway is a right
arising out of the Cortract Thus Sharps are entitledtoreasonableattorney fees expended in seeking those
payments. Agsin, those attorney fees should not include those fees expeniedmdefendi^
Lot 6 and the Roadway.
[24] Likewise, White Pine's suit for specific performance is a right arising ton Sharps' breach. We remand
for the court to determine areasonableattorney fee to be paid by Sharps for amountsreasonablyincurred by White
Pine at trial arri on appeal on the issues on wh
We also remand for
the court to deteranne areasonableattorney fee incuned by Shaips in pursuirg White R
Lots 1 to 6 and the Roadway.
XL TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
[25] White Pine claims the court acted within its discretion in issuing die September 1986 TRO prevertirg a
trustee's sale of Lot 6, the Roadway and all of the unplatted property.
Sharps claim the TRO constituted an abuse of discretion because White Pine material^ breached the Contract,

and because Shaips did not brcach.
Because we have determined that White Pine is entitled to the release of Lot 6 and the Roadway, we affirm the
restraining order until such time as Shaips have executed the releases in accordance with this opinion and with the
directions of the trial court on remand.
INCLUSION
To sum up our disposition of this complicated case, (1) we conclude the Contract is not ambiguous as it
pertains to the issues discussed herein; (2) we reaffirm die trial court's findings relating to White Pine's obligation
to pay property taxes on Lots 1 to 6 and the Roadway; (3) we reverse the court's conclusion regsrding Sharp's
duty to release Lot 6 and remand for the court to order its release pursuant to the Contract and in accordance with
this opinion; (4) we reverse the court's conclusion that Whte Pine is liable for unpaid i n s t a l ^ ^
interest thereon; (5) we affirm the court's conclusion that White Pine
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has no right to conveyance of the unplatted property; (6) we reversethe court's c o a ^ i s m r ^ i x l i i ^ White Rne's
liability for taxes on the unplattBd property; (7) we reverse the court's conclusion that the parties subsequently
modified the Contract regflrding the Roadway; (8) we remand for the trial court to order Sharps to convey the
Roadway; (9) we affirm the court's conclusion that White P t e is not ertided to benefit of
feba^
(10) we affiimthe court's conclusion that evidence of constructm iriaest is irrelevarl; (11) we remand for the
court to determine a reasonable attorney fee to be paid by Sharps for amountsreasonablyincurred by White Pine at
trial and on appeal as a result of White Pine's suit for specific performance of the release of Lot 6 and die Roadway
and for other amounts reasonably expended in enforcing the Contract "or any right arising out of breach or default
thereof; (12) we remand for the court to determine a reasonabfe attorn^ fee irnraed by
White Pine for unpaid taxes on Lots 1 to 6 and the Roadway; and (13) we affirm the restraining OKkrbarring
Sharps ftom disposing of the property.
JACKSON, J., cxmirs.
ORME, J., concurs,- except that as to section VIIII concur only in the result

FN1. A "PUD" is a Planned Unit Development, a private residential development having some characteristics in
common with a subdivision and condomin^^
Utah Code Arm. Sec. 57*1(1990). SteJSaunders, 793 P.2d at 929 a 2 for farther definition
FN2. Sharps cite Watdhie for the propositm
when determine whether to o r ^
In Watchie, the buyer had defaulted on payments
ofpriraple as well as taxes. Watchie, 448 P.2d at 363. The Watchie court noted that the "general rule" as
to "whether such a covenant for partial release continues to be enforceable after a default depends upon die
woiriir^ofthecovenartandthefk^
Id. at 362. In Watchie,
the court irterpreted lar^uage in the cortact to mean that the buyer m
conveyance, not that a defkift on taxes absolutely and
Thecourt
essentially affirmed the release order based on the language of the cortract "the decree does require that all of
the taxes on all of the property must be paid before the partial tramfo of propoty occurs." Id. at363. The
court thai ordered buyer to become current on taxes within sixty days, anl it ordered seller to release the land

in question. Id. at 364.
FN3. As we discuss later, White Pine's liability for taxes is restricted to that incurred on Lots 1 through 6 and the
Roadway.
FN4. White Pine argues that its obligate to pay interest and m
Our holding
that White Pine is not entitled to the unplatted property and that it is not obligated to pay installments, interest or
taxes on this property disposes of this issue.
FN5. Language in the plat, the Consent to Record and the Cbvenarts recorded on D e o e ^ ^
1983, also
supports the conclusion that White Pine's equitable interest in the Roadway vested when it tendered the
$620,000.00. That is, die plat indicated that the internal Roadway was to be private, and the Covenants
provided that easements over the lots and common area properties "are hereby reserved by Declarant [White
Pine], together with the right to grant and transfer the same."
FN6. Utah has a statute provki^
However, this
section, Utah Code Ana Sec. 78-27-56.5, enacted in 1986, is inapplicable here because the contract was
executed in 1981.
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Nov. 24,1987.
Construction company brought action against owners seeking recovery fix services in constructing duplexes.
TheFbuiADistrirtCcurt, Utah County, Robert J. Bullock, J., found infevorof construction conpany, and both
parties appealed. TheCourtof Appeals, Billings, J., heklthat: (1) there was no enforceable written or oral
contract absent meeting of minds as to contract price; (2) owners were not denied due process due tofeetthat
judgment was based on quantum meruit, theory which was not pled; and (3) statutory interest was calculable fiom
date on which owner signed settlement statemerlusedfordosirgonfinancir^.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
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Evidence of Agreement
95k28(3)
Weight and sufficient
UtahApp. 1987.
Firriing to there was no enforceable written or oral cortr^
evidence to parties did not agree on cortract price and to cortracto

2.

ACCORD AND SATCSFACnONk4
8
—

8k4
Form of agreement of accord.
UtahApp. 1987.
Setden^ statement iixir^ sale i m ^
constitute "executory accord," because there was no meeting of the minds.

3.

TRIAL k6(l)
388 —
3881 Notice of Trial and Pteliminary Proceedings
388k6
Notice of Trial
388k6(l) In general.
UtahApp. 1987.
Hearing in civil action must be prefaced bytimelynotice which adequately infonns parties of specific issues
they must be prepared to meet

4.

PLEADING k427
302 —
3Q2XVDI Waiver or Cure of Defects and Objections
3Q2k427 Objections to evidence as not within issues.
UtahApp. 1987.
Issues not expressly raised in pleadings may be tried by implied consent of parties.

5.

CX)NSTiTUnONALLAWk310
92
—
92XH Due Process of Law
92k304 Civil Remedks and Proceedings
92k310
Rules of pleading.
UtahApp. 1987.
Proof of quasHxxlract under allegatim
surprise or prejudice. U.S.C.A. Const Amend. 14.

6.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW k310
92
—
92XH Due Process of Law
92k304 Civil Remedies and Proceedings
92k310
Rules of pleading.
[See headnote text below]

6.

PLEADING k427
302 —
302XVHI Waiver or Cure of Defects and Objections
3Q2k427 Objections to evidence as not within issues.

UtahApp. 1987.
Defendants in breach of contract action were not denied due process due to trial court's award of damages
based on unpkd theory of quantum meruit, where surjjkmertal hearirg fixused m
underlying cost breakdown under construction contract, and m additional c»sts plairtffi
defendant's requested changes in specifications. U.S.C.A. Const Amend. 14.

7.

APPEAL AND ERROR kll78(6)
30
—
30XVII Determination and Dispcotion of Cause
30XVE(D) Reversal
30kll78
Ordering New Trial, and Directing Further Pirceedir^m Lower Coirt
30kl 178(6)
Ordering new trial of certain issues only.
UtahApp. 1987.
In contractor's acttm to recover for costs i r a r n ^ m
contractor damages based on theory of quantum meruit, but which gave owner credk for
initial cost breakdown was inconsistent, and requited remand for detemiinaticn of damage

8.

IMPLIED AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRACTS k55
205H —
205HI Nature and Grounds of Obligation
205HI(D) Effect of Express Contract
205Hk55
In general.
UtahApp. 1987.
Recovery under quantum meruit presupposes that no erfaceabb writtenOToral coita

9.

IMPLIED AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRACTS k2.1
205H —
205HI Nature and Grounds of Obligation
205HI(A) In General
205Hk2
Constructive or Quasi Contracts
205Hk2.1
In general.

Formeriy 2Q5Hk2
UtahApp. 1987.
Elements of "quasi-contract," or contract implied in law, are: defendant received benefit; appreciation or
knowledge by defendant of benefit; under circumstances that would make it u i ^ fee defendant to retain benefit
without paying for it
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial obstructions and definitions.

10.

IMPLIED AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRACTS kl 10
205H —

205HO Actions
2Q5HII(D) Amount of Recovery
2Q5HkllO In general.
UtahApp. 1987.
Measure of recovery under quaskxDnttact,crccrttactinpIiedinlaw, is value of benefit conferred on
defendant, and not detriment incurred by plaintiff, or necessarily reasonable value of plaintiff's services.
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and definitions.

11.

CONTRACTS k27
95
—
951
Requisites and Validity
951(B) Parties, Proposals, and Acceptance
95k27
Implied agreements.
UtahApp. 1987.
Elements of "axtract implied in tact" are: defendant requested plaintiff to perform work; plaintiff expected
defendant to compensate him or her for those services; and defendant knew or should have known that plaintiff
expected compensation.
See publication Words and Phrases for odier jiidicM constructiore and deiMions.

12.

INTEREST k37(l)
219
—
219H Rate
219k37
After Maturity of Debt
219k37(l) In general.
UtahApp. 1987.
Statutory legal rate of interest is applied from date payment is due to judgment date. U.C.A. 1953,15-1-1.
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial

13.

INTEREST k39(2.30)
219
—
219m Time and (Computation
219k39 Time from Which Interest Runs in General
219k39(2.5) Prejudgment Interest in General
219k39(2.30) Contract and sales matters.
UtahApp. 1987.
Day on which settlement statement was signed which was used at closing on financing fOTconstmcticn
was day that owner ackrcwtelged obligate
and
determination of interest due thus began on that date. U.C.A. 1953,15-1-1.
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Dallas H. Young, Jr., Jeny L. Reynolds, Provo, for defendant and appellant
GaryD. Stott,LynnS. Davies, Salt Lake City, for defendants and respondents.
Before GARFF, ORME and BHIJNGS, JJ.
BILLINGS, Judge:
Both parties appeal from the trial court's May 17,1985 judgment against defendant Olson, purporting to award
plaintifls their reasonable costs (plus irterest) incurred ^
We affirm the
trial court's finding that there was no contract, and the court's conclusion that quantum meruit was, therefore, the
proper theory of recovery. We, however, reverse the fiixlir^ of no liability
We
remand for findings as to whether he (1) requested plaintifls to perfomi woric and if so, to what extent, and/or (2)
received any benefits as a result of plaintifls' construction of the duplexes, and an entry of a judgment consistent
with those findings and o u r o p m m We farther reverse the trial court's calculation of damages against defendant
Olson and remand for a detemiination of te
and an entry of a judgment in that amount against defendant Olson.
FACTS
The following feds were developed in a bifurcated trial held on five nonconsecutive days over a two-year
eight-irorth period. (FN1) Plaintiff Davies and defendant Olson orally agreed that Davies would construct fcur
duplexes for Olson. The parties originally agreed that plairtiff Davies waikl construct the di^
$6,000 builder's profit per duplex." Based on this oral agreement, plaintiff Davies prepared a cost breakdown and
submitted it to Wasatch Bank for acquisition of loi^-tem financing, and to defendant Olson. Subsequently,
defendant Olson requested mmerous changes and additions to the original specifications for the duplexes.
Soon thereafter, defendants, in an attempt to establish a ceiling price on the
P ^ 746 P.2d 266 follows
cost of construction at $72,070 per duplex, prepared a cortrart and s u ^
In his letter to
plaintiffs, defendant Olson stated that the purpose of the proposed contract was "mainly to satisfy [defendant] Lund"
as he was concerned about fixing a ceiling price. This contract, however, was never executed.
A settlement statement, dated July 7,1981 and signed by defendant Lund, fixed the contract sales price at
$128,500. This settlement statement was used at the closing with Wasatch Bank. Wasatch Bank provided
permanent financing, which was mifficient to cover p l a i n t
Consequently, plaintifls
initiated an action against, among others, defendants Olson and Lund, alleging claims of fiaud, breach of contract,
and foreclosure of mechanics' liens. (The foreclosure claim was resolved).
After the initial trial on August 2,1982 and September 13,1982, the trial court entered judgment on August 4,
1983 against defendants Lund and Olson for $23,741.54 (FN2) plus 12% inters
1981.
The court found there was no agreement among the parties as to thetotalprice to be paid for the construction of
the duplexes. The court, however, based on the initial cost breakdown prepared by plaintiff Davfc^
defaidants jointly liable for $23,741.54. The court then found that plaintifls w o e addiiionalfy entitled to recover
from defendant Olson the reasonable costs incurred because of defendant Olson's requested changes in the duplex
specifications. (FN3) The court then directed counsel to negotiate and submit a figure as to the reasonable costs

plaintifls incurred because of defendant Olson's requested changes. The parties failed to reach an agreement
Consequently, a supplemental hearing was held on April 4,1985, April 10,1985, and April 16,1985, focusing on
the following issues previouslyreservedby the trial court

1. What were the plans and specifications upon which plairtifls and defendartsreM
2. What modifications were subsequent mate to those plam arri specificate
requests?
3. What were thereasonablecosts of the requested modifications which were actually made by plairtiflfef?
The trial court, in itsfinaljudgment of May 17,1985, found there was no meeting of the minds between the
parties "as to plans and specifications which formed the basis of the cost breakdown," and, therefore, that it erred in
basir^ its August 4,1983 judgment on that document The court concluded that in order to prevent unjust
enrichment of defendant Olson, plaintifls were entitled to recover theirreasonablecosts of construction from him.
The court, however, was silent: as to defendant Lund's liability. The court awarded plaintifls $51,773.96 plus
interest "at the legal rate of interest," accruing from July 7,1981, the date the settlement statement was executed.
The trial court calculated the May 17,1985 judgment as follows:
Reasonable cost of construction
$366,703.96
Less adjustment for water metes
1,350.00
NET CONSTRUCTION COST
365,353.96
Less the Amount of the August 4
Judgment (FN4)
313,580.00
May 17,1985 Judgmsnt to Haintiffi $51,773.96

Both parties appeal ftom the May 17,1985 judgment
L SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
[1] On appeal, we are asked to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support die trial court's finding of no
enforceable written or oral contract The
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trial court's findings of 6ct will not be set aside unless "ckarfyenOTeous." Utah RCrv.P. 52(a); State v. Wright, 744 P.2cl
315 (Utah aApp.1987); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191,193 (Utah 1987). A review of to record amply supports tte trial
court's findings (1) that t ^
(2) that there was no meeting of the minds as to which plans and specifications formed the basis of die cost breakdown
prepared by plaintiff Davies; and (3) that the parties did not i i ^ ^
Testimc^ at trial cmflicted sign^
Plaintiff Davies testified that he and defendant Olson
orally agreed tot plaintiff Davies would construct the four duptexes fo
Defendant Olson, on the other hand, while concedirg that cost plus $6,000 was d i s ^
open-ended deal. Subsequeit to to oral conversation
a cost breakdown and submitted it to Wasatch Bank and to defendant Olson. Thereafter, defendart Olson prepared a written
contract with a provision tot cost was not to exceed $72,070 per duptex, evidendy att

concern about cost Defendar* Olson preseried this p r q x ^
sign it This contract, however, was never executed.
Given the disparity in the testimony legending the contract price, the trial court's finding that there was no meeting of the
minds as to the contract price is not clearly erroneous.
[2] We also affirm die trial court's finding that the settlement statement used for closing on thefinancingdid not constitute
an "executory accord," because there was no meeting of fee minds. See Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730,
733 (Utah 1985); Sugqrhouse Finarre Co. v. Anierson, 610 P.2d 1369,1372 (Utah 1980). Tte settlement statement lists
the contract price as $128,500. At trial, cxxiflicting t e s t i n g was introduced r ^ ^
tothisfigure. Defendant Olson testified that he n e ^ agreed to a contract p r i s m a
Similarly,
defendant Lund's position is that he signed the settlement statement merely to assist defendant Olson to acquire long-term
financing, but that the settlement statement did not constitute an adorcwfe
After
reviewing the record, we do not believe the trial court's finding that the parties did not intend the settlement statement to
constitute an executoiy accord is dearly erroneous.
H. DUE PROCESS
Defendants contend that they were denied due process of law because the trial court's May 17,1985 judgment was based
on quantum meruit, a theory which was not pled, HOT r e s e n t
Wedisagree.
[3][4][5] A hearing must be prefaced by timely notice which adequately informs the parties of the specific issues they mus
be prepared to meet Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207,1212 (Utah 1983). Issues not expressty raised in the pleadings,
however, may be tried by the implied consent of the parties. General Ins. Co. v. Cknicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502,
506 (Utah 1976). Implied consent may be found where evidence is irtroduoed without o b ^ ^
Id. Moreover, proofofa
quasi-contract under an alkg3tion of a brea± of an express contract does not v ^
North Tillamook County Sanitary Authority v. Great American Ins. Co., 46 Qr.App. 173,611 P.2d 319, 321 (1980).
[61 Quantum meruit was, at least inferertiallv, an issue at the supplemental hearing. The supplemental hearing focused on
the plans and specifications underlying die cost breakdown and the additional costs plaintifls incurred because of defendant
Olson's requested changes in the duplex specifications. There is no stowing that defendants were surprised or prevented
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from presenting all evidence pertaining to the reasonable costs of construction or the benefits defendants received, nor that thej
were prejudiced by the trial judge relying on the theory of quantum meruit Fiirtheimore, any possible prejudice defendants
may have suffered is cured by our remand for a new trial on the issue of damages.
ffl. DEFENDANT LUND'S LIABILITY
The trial court, in its final May 17,1985 judgmert, wither
Lund of liability. The court did this although it had previously held him liable for the $23,741.54 j ^
Weareunable
to ascertain whether the court found that defendant Lundrequestedplaintifls to perform services, and if so, to what extent, or
whether any benefit was conferred upon defendant Lund by plaintifls'construct
If defendant Lund
requested services and received a benefit which would be unjustly retained, he is liable under quantum meruit (FN5)
Consequently, we remand to the trial court for findir^ on this issue and an e r t r y o ^
IV. MEASURE OF DAMAGES

Despite our approval of the trial court's decision to baserecoveryon quartum meant we, nonetheless,reversethe May
17,1985 judgmert because wefindthat it E
bits August 4,1983 judgment, the trial court based plairtifls'damages on the cost brea
liable.
[7] In its May 17,1985 judgment, the court determined that thoewasnomeedi^oftemindsastotheplansand
specifications underlying the cost breakdown, revo^ its prior conclusion. The court, therefore, premised its May 17,1985
judgment strictly on quartum meruit Nonetheless, in calculating the measure of damages assessed against defendant Olson,
the court g^ve defendant Olson credit fix the August 4,1983 jucfemert-ajudgmert based on a theory that the court had
rejected. Further, the court did not indicate whether cfefendart Luixl was stifl to
h m By giving defendant Olson credit for the August 4,1983 judgm^ an earlier j u d g n ^
judgment, on its fece, seems to supercede, the trial court, in eflfect,reducedthe amount of plairtifls' recovery. The trial court
did not indicate whether it intended the May 17,1985 judgment to be in addition to the August 4,1983 judgment, or instead
ofit(FN6) In light of these observations, wefindthat tteMay 17,1985judgn^isirtemalfy
patently unfeir to plairtifls under any irterpretation of the evidence. Therefore, wereverseandremandfor a determination of
damajges undo: quartum meruit
[8] Because weremandfor further proceedings, we attempt to provide some guidance to the trial court See Utah Farm
Production Credit Ass'nv. Watts, 737 P.2d 154,158 (Utah 1987). Quantum meruit is an action initiated bv a plaintiff to
recover payment for labor performed in a variety of circumstances in which thai plaintiff, for somereason,would not be able
to sue on an express contract Recovery under quartum meruit presupposes that no enforceable written or oral contract exists.
See Blue Ridge Sewer Improvement Dist v. Lowiy & Assos., Inc., 149 Ariz. 373,718 P.2d 1026 (CtApp.1986).
Confiision surrounds the use and application of quartum meruit, see, e.g., Irterfomi Co. v. Mitchell, 575 F.2d 1270 (9th
Cir.1978) (attempt^ to apply Idaho law); Hartwell Corp. v. Smith, 107 Idaho 134,686 P.2d 79 (CtApp.1984), because
courts have used die tarns quartum mem! contract implied infeet,contract implied in law, quasi-contract, unjust enrichment
and/orrestitutionwithout analytical precision.
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See, e.g., Euramca Bcosys v. Roediger Pittsburgh, Inc., 581 F.Supp. 415,422 (E.DJQ1.1984) (discussing quaskortract ,
claim in quartum meruit litigation): Idaho Lumber, Inc. v. Buck, 109 Idaho 737, 710 P.2d 647, 655-57 (CtApp.1985);
Sharp v. Laubersteimer, 347 N.W.2d 268,270 (Mirm.1984); Ellis-Jones, Inc. v. Western Waterproof Co., 66 N.CApp
641, 64647, 312 S.E.2d 215,218 (1984).
Quantum meruit has two distinct branches. Both branches, however, are rootedm''justice," see liikeshore Fia Corp. v.
Comstock, 587 F.Supp. 426,429 (W.D.MkiU984), to prevent the defendant's enrichment at the plaintiffs expense. See
Hazehvood Water Dist v. First Union Management, In:., 78 Qr.App. 226,715 P.2d 498 (1986).
[9] [10] Contract implied in law, also known as quaskxxtract or unjust enrichment is one branch of quartum meruit A
quasi-contract is not a contract at all, but rather is a legal action inrestitution.See 1 A. Cabin, Corbin on Contracts Sec. 19,
at 44,46(1963). The elements of a quaskxxtract, or a contract inplied in law, are: (1) the defendantreceiveda benefit; Q
an appreciation or knowledgeby the defendant of the benefit; (3) undo* circumstances that would nrake it unjust for the
defendanttoretainthe benefit without payir^forit See Berrett v. Stevens, 690 P.2d 553, 557 (Utah 1984) (usirg the term
"unjust enrichment"). The measure ofrecoveryunder quaskortract, cr cortract implied ^
conferred on the defendart (the d e f e n d
see First Inv. Co. v.
Andersen, 621 P.2d 683,687 (Utah 1980), or necessarily thereasonablevalue of the plaintiffs services.

[11] A contract implied in feet is the second branch of quantum meruit A contract implied in feet is a "contract"
established by conduct ^ Restatement (Second) of Contacts Sec. 5 comment a (1981). The elements of a contract implied
in feet arc: (1) the defendant requested the plaintiff to perfomiwodc; (2) the plaiiliff expected tte
him or herfor those services; and (3) the defendant knew or should have known that the plaii^e?q)ectedcon^msatm
SeeKirtz v. Read, 28 WasLApp. 731,626P.2d52,55 (1981); seeato Restatement (Second) of Contacts Sec. 5 commen
a (1981) (providing that temis of promise or a g i r a r ^ are those expressed m language of p a ^
conduct); 1 S. Willistoa Williston on Contacts Sec. 3. at 8-10 (1957) (defining implied in fact contracts as obligations arising
fiom mutual agreement and intert to promise where parties do not express a g ^ ^
lACcxbin,
Corbin on Contacts Sec. 18 (1963) (noting that implied contracts impose contractive duty by reason of promissory expression
and are no different than express contracts, althou^diflfan^innKxieof©q)ressingassal). 'Technically, recovery in
contract implied in fact is the amount the parties intended as the contact price. If that amount is unexpressed, courtswill infer
that the parties intended the amount to be thereasonablemarket value of the plaintiffs services." Kovacic, AProposalto
Simplify Quantum Memit T itip^tinn1 35 Am.U.L.Rev. 547, 556 (1986).
In the case before us, the trial court conecdy found that there was ro ^
must be based on quantum memit The courtfartherheld that plairtifls should recover theirreasonablecosts of constructing
the duplexes. The court correctly found a contract implied in feet It is undisputed that defendant Olson orally requested
plaintiff Davies to construct the duplexes, that plairtifls expected Olson to compensate them for those services, and that Olson
knew that plairtifls expected compensation. Thus, we remand as to defendant Olson for a detamination of the reasonable
value of plairtifls' services in constructing the duplexes, and an entry of judgment against him for that amount.
We are unable to determine what the court found as to defendant Lund. Thus we remand as to defendant Lund for
findings on whether herequestedplairtifls to perfomiwodc, and if so, to
benefits as
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a result of plairtifls' efforts. These findings wffl support te
plairtiflfe under quantum memit - a contract implied in law, or quantum meruit - a contract implied in fact or neither. As is
explained more fully supra, the measure of damages may differ depending on die theory adopted.
V. INTEREST
h awaiding damages, the applied
The 1981 amendment to section
15-1-1 increased the k g d rate of interest fiom 6 percent to 10 percent Utah Code Ana Sec. 15-1-1(1986).
[12] The statutory kgfll rate of interest is applied ftom the date paymert is due to the j ^ ^
593 P.2d 800, 809 (Utah 1979).

See IJgnell v. Berg,

[13] The trial court found July 7,1981, the date defendant Lund signed the settlement statement, as the due date, as that
was the date the benefit was conferred. It was also on this date that defendants acknowledged an obligation to pay plairtifls
for their s e n i u m a^nstructingttiedLplexes. We find that this determination is si^ported by substantial evidaice a ^
therefore win not distu* it on appeal. See id. at 810. Based on this factual detemiination, we find the appropriate rate of
interest is 10 percent
The May 17,1985 judgment is aflBimedin part and reversed in part The case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. Each party to bear its own costs.

GARFF, aid ORME, JJ., a m i r .

FNl. Thefirsttrial was held on August 2,1982 and September 13,1982. The supplemental hearing was held on April 4,
1985, April 10,1985, and April 16,1985. The confusion and inconsi^^
unfortunate interruptions in the trial.
FN2. The court found the cost per duplex to be $78,395. Multiplying thatfigureby the number of duplexes built (4), and
subtracting the construction costs paid by defendants, $289,838.46, yielded a judgment in the amount of $23,741.54.
FN3. The court did not enter judgment against defendant Lund for this additional recovery,findingthat defendant Lund
merely assisted defendant Olson in acquiring long-term financing.
FN4. The court credited defendant Olson with payment of $78,395 per duplex, multiplied by the number of duplexes built
(4), or $313,580. ^ N o t e ^ a p a ,
FN5. Of course, the court, on remand, couldfindother theorte of ieco\^ag?in^
including partnership or joint venture.
FN6. The earlier judgment was not madefinalpursuant to Utah RCiv.P. 54(b) and therefore would seem to be kgfllly
merged into or superceded by the May 17finaljudgmer*.

Utah Reporter, 155^868 P.2d
835 P.2d207, Shoreline Developmat, Inc. v. Utah County, (UtahApp. 1992)
Copyright (c) West Publishing Co. 1991 No claim to original U.S. Govt woris.
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SHORELINE DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah corporation, Milton
Jones, and Milton Hanks, Flaintifls, Appellees,
and Cross-Appellants,
v.
UTAH COUNTY and American Fork City, Defeiriait, Appellant,
and Cross-Appellee.
No. 910M-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
July 10,1992.
Alleged agent brought suit agsinst county for servicesrenderedm obtainirg dredgi^
used by county on lake. The Fourth District Cburt, Utah Couity^
veidictmiavorofagentonur^enr^^
County appealed and agent cross appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Bench, P.J., held that (1) claim for unjust enrichment was m
Governmental Immunity Act, and (2) agent was not entitled to awaid of prejudgment interest
Affirmed.

1.

APPEAL AND ERROR kl73(2)
30
—
30V
Presentation and Reservation in Lo\^« Court of Gramds of Review
30V(A) Issues and Questions in Lower Court
30kl73
Grounds of defense or opposition
30kl73(2)
Natures subject-matte-in general.
UtahApp. 1902.
County's claim that corporate powers of county statute barred claim by alleged agent for unjust enrichment as
result of its services in aiding county in obtain^ dredge, which claim \ ^
considered forfirsttime on appeal. U.C.A. 1953,17-4-5.

2.

<X>UNTESk208
10* —
104X11 Actions
104k208 Capacity to sue or be sued in general.
UtahApp. 1992.
Claim against couity by a g ^
was an equitable claim not barred by the Governmental Immunity Act, despite county's contention that it was
actirg in effort to control floodirg. U.C.A. 1953,63-30-3.

3.

COUNTIES k223
104 —
lMXH Actions
10ft223 Evidence.
UtahApp. 1992.
Jury'sfindinglhat countyreceivedbenefit of $94,000, as iesuk of agrt's sendees m aidingrountyin obteining
dredge was supported by sufficient evidence, even though c»urty never rnacfe use tf
themfromdredge because it was unable tofindway to retrofit dredging pumps for use; county tailed to marshal
evidence in support of $94,000 award, but only marshaled evidence showing efforts of agent and attempted to
counter evidence with some evidence of efforts ©qpended by ccurty and state, marjjarert
agent was not sole party involved in obtaining dredge.

4.

TRIAL k307(3)
388 —
388VHI CuaodyXorductardl^liheralionsofJury
388k307 Taking papers or articles to jury room
388k307(3) Dooimertary evidence and depositions.
UtahApp. 1992.
Trial court was not required to grant requests by jury during deliberations that deposition of witness, who had
been unavailable totestifyat trial, and whose derx^sirkxi rad been readtojury, be serttojury room Rules
Ov.Proc.,Rule47(m).

5.

INTEREST k39(2.20)
219 —
219IH Time and Computation
219k39 TimefromwrMi interest runs in general
219k39(2.5) Prejudgment interest in general
219k39(2.20) Particular cases and issues.
UtahApp. 1992.
Agent, which obtained unjust eririchment award from county for agent's services in obtaining dredge, was not
ertitled to award of prejudgment irierest; jury had discretion to award interest as part of equity judgment, so that
there was risk of double recovery.

6.

INTEREST k39(2.15)
219 —
219HI Trmeard Qmputation
219k39 Timefromwhich interest runs in general
219k39(2.5) Prejudgment interest in general
219k39(2.15) Liquidated or unliquidated claims in general.
UtahApp. 1992.
Detemiining factor in awarding rwejudgrnent interest is w h e t e dama
calculated with mathematical certainty.

7.

INTEREST k39(2.15)
219 —
219m Tmrearxi Computation
21*39
Time fromwhich interest nmsingeneral
219k39(2.5) Prejudgment interest in general
21*39(2.15) liquidated or unliquidated claims in general.
UtahApp. 1992.
If jury must determine loss by using its bestjudgmeri as to valuation r a t e
prejudgmal interest is inappropriate.

to

8.

INTEREST k39(2.20)
219 —
219m Time and Computation
219k39
Tiir^ fian \^iich i r t o ^ iuns m g m ^
219k39(2.5) Prejudgment interest in general
219k39(2.20) Particular cases and issues.
UtahApp. 1992.
Prejudgment interest must be sought directfy as damages in u i ^ e n r i d i m a ^
subsequent^ added by trial court to jury's award for unjust enrichment
Kay Btyson and Jeril B. Wilson, Provo, for appellant
Gregory J. Sanders, Salt Lake City, for appellees.
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Before BENCH, BILLINGS ani RUSSON, JJ.
AMENDED OPINION ON REHEARING (FN*)
BENCH, Presidirg Judge:
Shoreline Development, Inc., brought suit against Utah County for servicesrenderedby Shoreline in obtaining
dredging pumps intended to be used by the Courty on Utah Lake. The trial court entered a partial directed verdict
m the Courty's fevor dismissirg Shore
Shoreline's unjust enrichment claim, however, was
sent to the jury. The jury found in Shoreline's favor and awarded k $94,(XX3 for te savices raidaed. The
County appeals and Shoreline cross-appeals. We affirm.
FACTS
In 1985, Shoreline entered into an agreement with American Fork City (FN1) to operate a boat harbor the
City owned on Utah Late, which is located in UtahCounty. It was determined that a dredge was necessaryto
develop the harbor. Shoreline begpn to investigste ways of obtain^ a dredge and ended u^
Arseneau, the Director of State Surplus Property. They identified certain surplus fedaal government dredges tot
could be released for use on this project Ihe principals of Shoreline spertmany hours working on the project in

1985. Ifeginning in the early part of 1986, th^waeeachwoddi^onlteproje^
week.
Inmid-March, 1986, a meeting was held with the Utah Courty Commission to d i ^ ^
by Shoreline for American Fork. Mthire of therourtycommissioner
courty engineer. During the meeting, Shoieline outlined a proposal wherety it would o b t ^
Courtyarxi be given the exclusiverightstooperate k on U t ^ L ^ . Shoreline indicated it was focusing its efforts
upon te dredge "Harding" whkfo belong to the AmwCta^
The dredge had two large dredging pumps that couki be salv^^ for the Ctourty. The G m n i s s m took a voice
vote and authorized expenditure of $2,000 to get the project going.
Immediately after the meeting, Shoreline prepared a letter menxrializi^
with the commissioners. That letter was hand carriedtothe Granission the next day. When the written
memorialization of the agreement was delivered, a die± for $2,(X^
No express written
contract was executed by die parties.
Shoreline then moved forward u r i ^
and set up business operate
Shoreline presented the County with written reports concerning its
investigation. Shoreline again met with two of the courty comnMsskxios to discuss the project m
dredge Harding in particular. Shoreline claims that the commissioners agamtookan e x p r e s s ^
specifically authorized Shoreline to proceed with oblainirg a dredge fcr the < ^ ^
Ore of the principals of
Shorelineremembersa commissioner ^ecifically statir^ to no bid process was requ^
agreement to be made.
A f e this second meeting with ti^
pun^oflFtheltod^fotheQxirty. IneariyJuneof 1986, it becameknown that the dredging pumps were
going to make it to Utah. The principals of Shoreline then r ^
including the mayor of AmaicanFbric. They weretotallysurprised inthat meetii^ whenfe commissioners
thanked ten for their efforts in obtaining fe dredging pumps and t
Qneofthecommissbnerssu
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Afler Shoreline had bear excused from the deal, the govemnaert pcpowxxk was con^
pumps woe delivered to the Courty. The county's engineer signed one document acknowledging that fee value of
the dredge was $6,022,563. Courty commissioner Gary Anderson, in acc^tingtfiedredge, ^so signed a
document acknowledging its value at $6,022,563.
Shoreline presented a bill for $250,000 to the Ccurtyfrc the value
tf
The
Courty refused to pay the bill and Shoreline brought suit Shoreline claimed the County was liable undo* an
express cortractiMagreemert: that Shordre
In the alternative, Shoreline
claimed that if tee was no express contract, the County was liable undo* an inpbed-in-fect contract as evidenced
by the work actually performed by Shoreline. As afinalalternative, Shoreline claimedtiiatthe County was liable
for the unjust enrichment itreceivedfrom Shoreline's efforts.
At the close of Shoreline's evidence, the County moved for a directed verdict as to the express contract and the
inplied-in-fect contract claims. The Courty argued that it was protected irom ar^ cortiactu^

not act in accoidance with stale code or its own customaiy practices in dealing with Shoreline and therefore it could
not be bound by those acts. The County conceded at that time that the u i ^ e n r i c h n ^ claim
presented to the jury. Tte trial court agreed and graiied a d i r e c t
first two claims. The County thai rested, without puttirgmary case of its own, ar^
was s a l to the jury. The jury awarded Shoreline $94,000 for services rendered. Shoreline thai requested
prejudgment interest on the $94,000, but the trial court denied the request
The Courty appeals, claiming it is shielded firm fe u r ^ enrich^
Sec. 17-4-5
(1991) (corporate powers of a courty), and by Utah Code Arm. Sec. 63-30-3 (1989) (the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act). (FN2) The Courty also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to w h e t e ^
benefit from Shoreline's efforts. And finally, the Courty claims tot the trial cxxirt ared in refasing to altaw the
jurytotakeirrtothejuryrocxnadepo
Shoreline cioss-appeals the denial of
prejudgment interest, claiming
toiriaestmaybeawaidedmanur^em
(FN3)
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
Defenses
[1] The Courty asserts that Shorelte^

Sec. 17-4-5

(1991). This defense was notraisedbelow. We will not address issuesraisedfor thefirsttime on appeal. See
ZkxE First Nat Bank v. National Am. Titte Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651,654 (Utah 1988).
[2] The Courty also asserts that Shoreline's unjust enrichment claim is barred by the Governmental Immunity
Act, Utah Code Ann Sec. 63-30-3 (1989), because the Cburty was actirg in an effort
The
supreme court has clearly held that "governmental immunity may not be used as a defense to equitable claims...."
Board of Educ. of Gianite School DisL v. Salt Lake Courty, 659P.2d 1030,1036 (Utah 1983) (quantum meruit
claim upheld where courty "acquiesced in the receipt of the benefit"). (FN4) Shoreline's
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unjust enrichment claim is therefore not barred by the Governmental Immunity Act
Sufficiency of the Evidence
[3] The Courty challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding that the Courty received a
benefit in the amount of $94,000. In particular, the County argues that fe benefit of Shoreline's s e n ^
have been $94,000 because the County received no "net benefit" from obtaining the dredge. After the dredging
pumps w o e removed from the dredge, the Courty never made use of ten. The Courty argues that it was
simply unable to find a way to retoft the
In feet, thefederalgovernment
ultimately repossessed them. The County ens, however, in focusing on the "net beneft" of the ertire transacts
The appropriate benefit upon \ ^ ^
be awarded, is the servicerenderedby Shoreline in obtaining the dredge. The feet that following thereceiptof this
benefit the County was unsuccessful in making a profitable use of the dredge is immaterial to the valuation of
Shoreline's services. The County, not Shoreline, bore the risk the verture might feil.
The County has failed to satisfy its burden of maishaliig the evidence in support ^
received a bereft worth $£t,000. Hodges v. Gibson Prod. Co., 811 P.2d 151,156 (Utah 1991) (appellant must
set out all evidence that supports jury verdict, including all valid inferences, and demonstrate "that reasonable

personswould not conclude that tte evidence supports tte verdict"). The County does marshal the evidence
showirg the efforts of Shoreline and attempts to courier it with some evidence of the efforts expended by the
County and the State in an apparent attempt to show that Shoreline was not tte sole party
dredge. The primary focus of the Cbunty's nraKhalin&
the venture. The County has not marshaled the evidence in support of tte $94,000 award. Nowhere in the
County's attempt to marshal is there any indication that tte services re
worth$94,000. We therefore do not disturb the jury award. &ea_eig1JState v. Christoflferson, 793 P.2d 944,917
(Utah App.1990) (when appellant foils to marshal, revfewir^ court presumes that te
supported by the dear weight of the evidence).

DEPOSITION
[4] During its deliberations, the juryrequestedthat the deposition of William Arseneau be sent into the jury
room. Due to the unavailability of Aiseneau, his depositm had been readmit
The trial court refused to allow the deposition tote sent to tte juiy room because
might receive more weightthan other oral testimony. The County argues that the trial court erred in not altowing
the jury to review the deposition.
Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 47(m), the jury may not take depositions with them when they deliberate.
(FN5) The question of whether written testimoitysh^
in State v. Solomon, 96 Utah 500, 87 P.2d 807, 811 (1939), wherein tte supreme court teki: 'Tte law does rx*
permit depositions or witnesses togptothejuryroom." (FN6)
In light of Rule 47(m) and the supreme court's unequivocal holding that depositions are not permitted in the
jury room, we find no error.
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PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
[5] In its cross-appeal, Shoreline challenges the trial court's refusal to award prejudgment interest on the
$94,000 urgust enrichment award. Shoreline asserts that prejudgment irierest shouM
enrichment claim M s somewhere between die poles of express contract claims, where prejudgment interest is often
allowed, andtortclaims, where prejudgmert irterest is s e k t o
In particular, Shoreline asserts that the
similarity between an unjust enrichment claim arid a c o n t ^
interest Shoreline's reliance on the nature of tte claim, towevrc, is misplaced.
[6] [7] The determine
prejudgment interest is sought can be cakxilated with m
See, e.g.. JackB. Parson Constr. Co.
v. State, 552 P.2d 107,10&O9 (Utah 1976) (amour* due under tte c o n t r a c t s
"A
court can award prejudgment interest only when tte loss is fixed at a particular tin^
with accuracy." Smith v. linmar Energy Cdrp., 790 P.2d 1222,1225 (Utah App.1990). If tte jury must
determine the loss by using its best judgment as to valuatm rather than fixed star^
interest is inappropriate. M._S^_Bjork v. April Indus., Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah) cert, denied. 431 U.S.
930,97 S.Q. 2634,53 L.Ed.2d 245 (1977) (where damages cannot be calculated with mathematical accuracy, tte
amount of tte damage must be ascertained and assessed by tte trier of fact and prejudgment interest is not
allowed); Fell v. UnionPac. Ry. Co., 32 Utah 101, 88 P. 1003,1006 (1907) ("In all... cases wtere tte damages

are incomplete and are peculiarly within the province of the jury to assess at the time of the trial, no interest is
permissible.").
The Utah Supreme Courtrecentlyindicated that die lack of mathematical certainty generally prevents an award
of prejudgment interest in equity claims.
A survey of cur cases where prejudgment interest was awarded indicates that interest has been allowed in
actions for damage to personal property, in actions brought on a w r t o
liquidated overpayment of water subscriptm charges, hi many of these cases, we stressed that the loss had
been fixed as of a definite time and the amount of the loss can be calculated with mathematical a ^
accordant with wefl-establis^
No case has been cited to us where we have allowed
prejudgmal interest in an action such as toe instart case, which is for equitabfer
"A suit of this nature ...
invokes consideration of the principles of equity which address themselves to the conscience and discretion of
the trial court" In view of the highfy equitable n ^ ^
determining the amount, if any, to be [awarded to the plaintiff], we find no error indie denial of prejudgment
interest
Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089,1097 (Utah 1991) (citations omitted) (quotirg Fullmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d
606,610 (Utah 1976)).
Shoreline asserts that tee is a public policy ground for awarding interest in equity cases despite the uncertainty
ofthedamages. While we recognize Shoreline's concern that injured parties be r ^
concern is adequately addressed by reason of the feet that equity plaintifis may claim lost interest as part of thendamages. Uinta P^elineCcxp. v. White Superior^., 546P.2d885, 8 8 7 ( U ^
require, interest may be awarded as part of the damages). Since a jury has discretion to award interest as partofan
equity judgment, there is a risk of double recovery if prejudgment: interest may be added to a jury's equity award
by the trial court who does not know whether the jury's awairico\^ interest In order to prevent such double
recovery, we presume that if the claimant was entitled to any interest, it was awarded by the jury as part of the
equity award.
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[8] Given the risk of double recovery, and in light of the supreme court's ruling in Bellon, we hold that
prejudgment interest must be sought directly as damages in urgustenri±mert cases, if at all. Prejudgment; interest
may not be subsequertfy added by a trial court to a jury's award for u r ^ enrichment We therefore find no error
in the trial court's refusal to award Shoreline prejudgment interest on the $94,000 judgment awarded by the jury.
CONCLUSION
AstotheCouity'sappealofthejud^^
befowsowedonotaddressitforthefii&ti
Furthemiore, the county may not raise governmental
immunity as a cfefeise against an e q u i ^
As to the assertion that the trial court erred
in refusir^ to alfow the deposition m f e
As to Shoreline's cross-appeal requesting
prejudgmal interest, we also find no error. Thejudgmotistho^oreafiSrmed.
BILLINGS and RUSSON, JJ., a m i r .

* Replaces this court's opinion offliesame namefiledon May 19,1992 (187 Utah AdvJRep. 26).
FN1. American Fork has settled with axxeline and is not a party to this appeal.
FN2. Ihe Govemmertal I n r a i ^
section 63-30-3(3) (Supp.1991).

See

FN3. Shoreline also cross-appeals the dismissal of its cortract claims but o ^
if we reverse tte u r ^ enrichment award. Inasmuch as we affim the judgment, we need not address the trial
court's legal conclusions as to die first two claims.
FN4. &eje^Concrete Products Co. v. Salt Lake County, 734 P.2d 910,911-12 (Utah 1987) (quantum meruit
claim was recognized as permissible, but claim Med for lack of evidence that county was directly benefitted);
Bratlir^Bros. Constr., Inc. v. Utah Golden Spikers, In:., 597 P.2d 869, 872 (Utah 1979) (remarried for
further proceedings regsrding quartum menik claim agpi^
presenting claim).
FN5. Rule 47(m) provides, in relevant part and with our emphasis, "[u]pon retirirg ft*
take with than the instructions of the court and all exhibits and all papeis which have been received as
evidence in the cause, except depositions...."
FN6. I t e supreme rourtreaffim^ its

to

14-15 (Utah 1984).
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ArvinL. BELLON, Maurine G. Bellon, B. Curtis Dastrap, Lanis
B. Dastmp, and A. Labium & Sons, Lie., Plaintiffs
and Appellees,
v.
Marvel L. MALNAR, Defendant and Appellant
No. 880226.
Supreme Court of Utah.
March 29,1991.
Assignees of defaulting vendee sued vendor forrestitutionof payments made prior to default and forfeiture.
The Eighth District Court, Duchesne County, Boyd Bunnell, J., awarded judgment ag9inst vendor and in fevor of
assignees in amount of $71,173.33. Vendor appealed. The Supren^ Court, Howe, Associate C.J., held that (1)
vendor was entitled to proceeds ftom condemnation award as payment of damages to lands he repossessed
inasmuch as vendee's equitable title wasforfeitedbefore award was made; (2) assignees were not entitled to
appreciated value of property on which vendee defaulted; (3) \mtor was not entitled to loss of baig3^
when property had appreciated in value; (4) court would not enforce forfeiture clause inasmuch as enforcement
would altow unconscionable recovery to vendor, and (5) assignees were not entitled to prejudgment iniereston
award.
Remanded for purpose of amendiqg judgment

1.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER k44
400
—
4001 Requisites and Validity of Contract
4O0k44
Evidence.
Utah 1991.
Trial court's finding that vendor intended to convey tide to 6*cre tract of land to vendee at time of closing of
real estate contract for 76 acres, rather than upon payment of $3,000 per acre over and above specified annual
payments in contract, so as to require exelusm of 6 acres firm 1
vendor was not clearly erroneous. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 52(a).

2.

QUIEI1NG TITLE klO.l
318
—
3181 Right of Action and Defenses
318k9
Tile of Plaintiff
318kl0.1
Necessity of haviig title or interest

Formerly 318klO(l)
Utah 1991.
Trial court was not authorized to quiet tide to 6 ^ o e tract agsinst voider in suit by vendee's assignees for
restitution of payments made by vendee prior to his default on contract for sale of 76 acres, where assignees of
vendee never owned 6-acre tract and made no claim to it, and appropriate parties to quiet tide action were not
before court

3.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER k341(5)
400
—
400VII Remedies of Purchaser
400VH(A) Recovery of Purchase Money Paid
400k341
Proceed^
400k341(5)
Amount and items of recoveiy.
Utah 1991.
Inrestitutionsuit by vendee for paymerts made prior to defedt on real estate c ^
property was to be calculated at time of defkrtt, rather than at later d ^
acquiesce in forfeiture after default and interfered with marketable tide, where vendor failed to plead interference
with marketable tide, and testified that b e t w ^
acquiescing in forfeiture, vendor made no attempt to resefl property or to l t e i w i f o

4.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER k341(3)
400
—
400VII Remedies of Purchaser
400VH(A) Recovery of Purchase Money Plaid
400k341
Prooedir^s
400k341(3)
Evident.
Utah 1991.
Trial court's factual finding that value of real property subject to real estate contract on which vendee defaulted
was $180,000 was not clearly enoneous in view of uncortroverted expat testimony that land was worth $180,000
at time of default

5.

EMINENT DOMAIN kl53
148 —
148II Compensation
148H(D) Persons Entitled and Payment
148kl51
Feisons Entitled
148kl53
Vendor or purchaser.
Utah 1991.
Vendor was entitled to proceeds from condemnation award in payment of damages to lands she repossessed,
where equitable title was forfeited by vendee before award of compensation was made, and vendee and his
assignees stipulated that any proceeds would gp to vendor. U.C.A. 1953,78-34-9.

6.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER k341(5)
400 —
400VII Remedies of Purchaser
400Vn(A) Recovery of Purchase Money Paid
400k341
Proceedings
400k341(5) Amount and items of recovery.
Utah 1991.
Vendee, who defaulted on property which had appreciated in value, was not ertided to appreci^
forrestitutionof payments made by vendee before default.

7.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER k341(5)
400 —
400VE Remedies of Purchaser
400Vn(A) Recovery of Purchase Money Paid
400k341
Proceedings
400k341(5) Amount and items of recovery.
Utah 1991.
Appreciated value of property, on which vendee defaulted, negated vendor's entidement to damagesforloss of
advantageous bargain in vendee'srestitutionsuit for payments made before default

8.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER k341(5)
400 —
400VH Remedfes of Purchaser
400VII(A) Recovery of Purchase Money Paid
400k341
Proceedings
400k341(5) Amount and items of recovery.
Utah 1991.
Attorneyfeesexpended by vendor in eminent domain actkn were not damages whkii vender c c ^ deduct in
restitution suit by vendee for payments made prnr to vendee's default, where v e n ^
pay fees in absence of contract with vendee.

9.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER k341(5)
400 —
400VII Remedies of Purchaser
400VII(A) Recovery of Purchase Money Paid
400k341
Proceedings
400k341(5) Amount and items of recovery.
Utah 1991.
Vendee's failure toreturn6-acre tract, tide to which was conveyed attimeof closing, upon vendee's default
constituted item of vendor's damages in vendee's suit forrestitutionof payments made prior to default

10.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER k341(5)

400
—
400Vn Remedks of Purchaser
400VII(A) Recovery of Purchase Money Paid
400k341
Proceedings
400k341(5)
Amount and items of recovery.
Utah 1991.
Vendor's damages for vendee's nonreturn of fracre tract, title of which was conveyed at closing, represented 6
times contract price of $2,000 per acre, not value of tract when buyer defaulted on land contract in vendee's
restitution action for payments made prior to default, where vendor intended to convey title to 6-acre tract at
closing.

11.

INTEREST kl3
219
—
2191 Rights and Liabilities in General
219kl3
Default in payment in general.
Utah 1991.
Trial court properly allowed vendor interest on contract after default as alternative to fair rental value in
vendee's restitution suit for payments made prior to default on land contract

12.

VENDOR A N D PURCHASER k79
400
—
400D Construction and Operation of Contract
400k79
Conditions and provisos.
Utah 1991.
Court would not enforceforfeitureclause in real estate contract, where recovery by vendor of over $26,000 in
excess of actual damages indicated that liquidated damages bore no reasonablerelationshipto actual damages upon
vendee's default

13.

CONTRACTS k318
95
—
95V
Performance or Reach
95k318
Discharge of contract by breach.
Utah 1991.
Supreme Court will enforceforfeitureclause in contract unless it finds that forfeiture would be so grossly
excessive in relation to any realistic view of loss that might nave been contenplatedty
shock the conscience that court of equity would refuse such forfeiture.

14.

INTEREST k39(2.30)
219
—
219HI Time and (Computation
219k39
Timetrom Which Interest Runs in General
219k39(2.5) Prejudgment Interest in General

219k39(2.30) Contract and sales matters.
Utah 1991.
Vendees were not entitled to prejudgment interest on award in vendee's favor in suit for restitution of payments
macte on laixi contort
P&ge 808 P.2d 1091 follows
Gordon A. Madsen, Robert C. Cummings, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant
Robot F. Orton, Viiginia G n ^
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice.
Defendant Marvel L. Malnar appeals from a judgment entered against ha* and in favor of plaintiffs, who are
assignees of the buyer ina real estate cxxtract with Malnar as seller. The action was brought by plaintiffs for
restitution of the payments made by the buyer before he defaulted and Malnar forfeited his interest in the contract
and the property.
I. FACTS
On December 19,1980, plaintiffs' assignor, FenmEWer, entered irio a real e s t ^
Malnar 76 acres of land in IXchesne Cburty, t q g e t e
The
contract provided for a down payment of $23,500 and for annual installnrat payments of $26,345.18 beginning in
December 1981. A warranty deed to the foil acreage was executed by Malnar and placed m escrow, with delivery
conditioned upon c o m p t e
A quitclaim deed from Eder to Malnar was also placed
m escrow with instractions
At the closing of the sale,
Malnar executed a separate warranty deed to Elder for 6 acres of the land. This deed was then recorded, which
Malnar now asserts was due to a mistake.
Ekiermacfe the down paymert and the 1981 ar^
Early in 1984, when the 1983
payment was past due, Malnarserved a notice of defalk upon Eder. The default was not cured, and
subsequently, the quitclaim deed to the 76 acres from Elder to Malnar was delivered by the escrow agent to
Malnar, who recorded it on February 3,1984. Malnar asserts that at that time approxinrately one year's interest
had accrued in the amount of $10,247.80 and there were delinquent real estate taxes and water assessments.
Shortly after default, Eder assigned his tide and interest in the property ariicortatf
Resources, which recorded a notice of irierest agsinst the entile 76 acres. One year after default, Elder conveyed
die 6 acres to one Darnell
Pfcge 808 P.2d 1092 follows
Didericksen, who thereafter encumbered it with a mortgage.
On October 18,1982, while the contract was in force, Deseret Transmission commenced an action to
condemn a right-of-way across the 76-acre tract to erect high-tension power lines. On March 7,1985, Malnar,
Elder, and his assignees entered into a stipulation in that action that (1) Malnar was die owner of all the property,
(2) Malnar was to receive the entire condemnation proceeds, and (3) Eder and his assignees retained the right to
assert a claim to equitable restitution of the monies forfeited under the installment contract of December 19,1980.

The condemnation action was tried and resulted in a takir^ by Deseret Transmission of a rightof-way over
5.21 acres. Malnar received compensation fix the taking totalling $41,075. She expended $6,000 fix attorney fees
in connection with the condemnation action, leaving her with $35,075.
Eastern Utah Resources commenced die instant action fix "equitable restitution" of the down payment and
1981 and 1982 annual installments which weie forfeited to Malnar
Pericins v. Spencer, 121
Utah 468,243 P.2d 446 (1952). Before trial, Eastern assigned its intereststoplaintiflfe. A bench trial was teld at
which the value of the 76 aaes when the defeuttaxurred was in dispute. Plairtifls presented testimony that tte 76
aaes, including the 5.21 aaes over whi± therightof-waywas tak^
Malnar testified that
the tract was worth $101,000 at most, not including the 5.21-aae tract, but that in any evert it was not worth more
than $700 to $800 pa* aoe. In addition, Malnar's appraiser testified that te value of the 70 aaes (exeludirgte
aaes conveyed at closing) in 1985, at the time the stipulation betweoi the parties was made, was $1,400 per aoe,
totalling $98,000. Testimony was also adduced that by the date of trial the value of the tract had deoeased
substantially due to economic decline in die Duchesne region
The trial court found that at the time Mains* recoided die quitclaim deed to the 76 aaes, their value was
$180,000. The courtfartherfound that the 6 aaes conveyed at closirg were mistaken^
in the quitclaim deed and that Malnar had r»irtaest in that tract The court valued the 6-aoe tract at $30,000and
subtracted that anxxir*fromtte $180,000totalvalue to arrive at $150,000 value for the 70 aaes. Tothatamount
it added the $35,075 net recovery in the condaimation action, for atotalof $185,075.
The trial court confuted Malnar's damages byfirstsubtract^ the
to^
$50,080.65,
from $152,000, tte contract price, kavir^ $101,919.35. Tte court then added $10,247.80 for tte accrued interest
due when the default occurred and $1,774.52 fa- delinquent real property taxes and water assessments, fa* a
balance owing to Malnar undo: tte contract of $113,941.67.
Tte court subtracted that balance, $113,941.67, from ttetotalamount she had received, $185,075, and
awarded judgmertagsinst her and in fa^^
Malnar appeals.
H. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Wefirstenunciate die standard of review for legal conclusions and factualfindings,as both are assigned as
error in tte instant: case. "A trial court's legal conclusions are aocorcied no particular defe
we review them
forconedress." Grayson Roper Dd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467,470 (Utah 1989). However, a trial court's
findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, will not be set aside on appeal unless clearly
erroneous. M.; Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). This "clearly erroneous" standard is applicable in equity cases such as tte
instart case. Bourtiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174,1175 (Utah 1989); Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147,150 a 1
(Utah 1987).
HI. THE DISPUTED 6-ACRE TRACT
[1] Malnar assigns as error tte court'sfindingthat she intended to convey tte 6-acre tract of land to Elder at
tte time of closing. Thisfindingis reviewed undo-tte
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ckarfy erroneous standard. On tte day of closing, December 19,1980, four separate documents were agned
\^hkhbearipDntedi^x3sitmoftte6aaes: (1) an earnest money receipt and agreement dated December 18,

1980, and signed either that day or the next day, providing for a sale price of $152,000 for 76 aaes; (2) the real
estate contract dated and signed on December 19; (3) a wanaity cbed conveyi^
(4) a
quitclaim deed executed by Eder conveying 76 acres back to Malnar in the event of Elder's default.
The real estate contract provides in paragraph 17:
Upon payment of the sum of $3.000 in addition to the annual payments hereinrequired.Sella" agrees to
release 1 acre lots. The releases will be upon approval of Bow Valley Resources of Daivo-,Cbloiado. Bayer
shall receive credit for all sums paid for lot rek^ on the last paymerts to become due. It is not intended that
said $3.000 per acre should be extra consideration, but merely eariy payment for early release of the lot
(Emphasis added.) Malnar argues that this language in the cortract indicates her i r ^ ^
parcel only upon payment of $3,000 per acre "ova- and above the specified annual payments."
Plaintiffs counter with language in the "earnest money receipt and offer to purchase," which provides:
Sella" to cany balance over a five year period with 5 anmal payments, first anmal payment 1 year ftom
closing. Interest on the balance will be 10%. Seller to release 6 acres at closing and will release 10 acre
parcels upon paymert of $3,000.00 per acre allreleasesmust be approved by Bow Valley of Denver
Colorado. Released parcel will start on the northern boundary line and move in a scutheriy d i ^ ^
Plairtifls argue that the 6-acre parcel was deeded "fire and cfear" and that the pro
release upon paymert of $3,000 per acre was one or more lOacre parcels separate from die 6 acres.
The trial court heard testimony on teirtert of the parties when they s
Elder
testified that he was being given title to 6 acres for payir^$2,(XX) per acre fete 76 aaes instead of $1,500 per
acre, flie original asking price. He paid for the 6 acres "at the tin^ of teagreem^" andtestifiedthat he "was
given clear, fee title.M Mabiartestifiedthat she thought the deed to the 6 acres was gping into escrow and that she
wouki not have signed the deed had she known
te
Another
witness present at the closingtestifiedthat therewasalotofconfasionatthattime. The prices on the real estate
contract had to be amended and the warranty deed signed. Due to the confusion, the parties did not make the
change "on the Quit-Claim Deed nor the Warranty Deed to nratch what actually happened that day."
The trial court found:
It was the intent of Elder and Malnar that [Elder] receive title to die said six (6) acre parcel at closing on
December 19,1980, as is more particularfy evidenced ty the folbwirg fedeliveiy to Elder en December
19,1980, of the warranty deed covering the six (6) acres and therecordingby Elda-of said deed; the earnest
money agreement dated December 18,1980, which provided that the said six (6) acres tract be conveyed to
Elder; and the treatment by Elder after dosing on Decembo-19,1980, ofthesaidsix(6)aaesashissole
property by making conveyances and assignments withrespectthereto.
In view of the intended immediate conveyance of the 6 acres, the courtfartherfound that the failure to exclude
die 6 acres from die legal description in die quitclaim deed to Malnar was a mistake by Elder, Malnar, and the
drafter of the instruments.

While Malnar disputes the finding that she intended to immediately convey the 6 acres, the into! of the parties
is a question of fact We will not disturb the trial court's findh^ unless k is ckarfy oroneous. See Utah R Q v . P .
52(a); Sacramento Baseball Club, In:, v. Great Northern Baseball Co., 748 P.2d 1058,1059-60 (Utah 1987).
Thefinding?are not "agsinst the
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great weight of evidence," Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d at 1175, and are not clearly erroneous.
[2] We do, however, agree with Malnar that it was error for the court to quiettitleto the 6 acres agsinst ha*.
Neither plairtifls nor Malnar sought to quiettitle. Indeed, plaintifls never owned the tract and made no claim to it
Malnar could not have sought to quiet tide in fe actm since neither EHer, D
party. It was therefore error for die court to d ^ ^
Thatpart
of the judgment is reversed.
IV. VALUATION OF THE PROPERTY
[3] Malnar corteidstiiatdE trial cou^
1984 when the default occurred. She first assarts that the date of valuation should be March 7,1985, because
Elder's assignees refused to acquiesce in the forfeiture and claimed owners^
The
trial court properly concluded as a matter of law that fair market value should be determined as of the time of
breach, which was February 3,1984. This is the general rule in real estate contracts. See Webster v. DTTiapano,
114 A.D.2d 698,494 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1985); Quigley v. Jones, 174 Ga.App. 787, 332 S.E.2d 7, affd, 255 Ga.
33, 334 S.E.2d 664 (1985); Lake Share Investors v. Rite Aid Corp., 55 Md.App. 171,461 A.2d 725, affd* 298
Md. 611,471 A.2d 735 (1983); American Mechankal Corp. v. Union Mach. Co. of Lynn, Inc., 21 Mass.App.
97,485 N.E.2d 680 (1985). As the trial judge stated from die bench, Mahiar's assertion appears to be a claim for
irieifaence with n^iketable tide, \^iich wouki have to be aflBm^tively pleaded. No such pleading was made, and
the trial judge correcdy confined his valuatkxitothetimeofdefkikwlra
property. In addition, Malnar testified that between thetinreof retaldr^ the property an^
removing the cloud on the tide, she made no attempt to resell the property or to list it with a real estate broker.
Thus Malnar was not prevented from seflir^ tic property by arty action of Ekler or ta
[4] Malnarfartherasserts that the trial court's fectual findirg valuirg the propeity
An
expat witness for plaintifls testified that the land was watfi $180,000. Maker's appraiser affixed a lesser value to
the land in 1985 but was unable to give an opnkxi on the \^lue of die property in 1984. The valuation finding is
therefore not dearly erroneous.
V. CONDEMNATION PROCEEDS
[5] Malnar next contendstiiatdie trial court erred in charging her widi die $35,075 net condemnation award as
ifkhadbeenpaklbytiiebuyerasprinc^
When die condemnation action was filed, Eider held
equitable tide to die land. That
tife
After forfeiture
and before the award, Elder and his assignees stipulated that any proceeds should go to Malnar. Malnar argues
that where forfeiture occurs before a condemnation award is made, die vendor takes die land bade burdened by die
condemnation and is therefore entitled to die proceeds since they are in payment of damages to die lands he
repossesses. We agree.
The trial judge found diat "on October 18,1982, an order of immediate occupancy was entered and a required

cash deposit paid into the court by [condemnor] for tte landowner." UtahCodeArai Sec. 78-34-9 provides in
pertinent part
The rights of the just compensation for the land so taken or damaged shaH vest in tte parties e n t i ^
and the said judgment shall include ... interest... fiom the date of taking actual possession thereof by the
plaintiff or order of occupancy, whichever is earlier....
(Emphasis added.)
The court's authority in protecting the vested interests of both parties v ^ explained m
v. Third
Judicial District Court, 29 Utah 2d 472,475-76,511 P.2d 739,742 (1973). Tte condemn*
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deposits money in court. Ujpon proper application, tte court orders ^
However, the
vendee is normally entitled to the condemnation award as he is the equitable owner. The court can therefore make
orders with respett to encunrtxanxsa^
Justice, equity, and
practicality are considered by the court in protectir^tiieintaests of the parties.
In the instant case, however, before any disbursements w o e ordered firm te fimds d
condemnor, defeult occurred. Both equitable and kgsl title vested in Malnar, with tte concomitant r i ^
the eminent domain proceeds. It was a practical solution for the parties to stipulate that tte proceeds would go to
Malnar. The proceeds stood in lieu of the rightof-way taken. The defaulting vendee is this credited with
returning the condemned land undamaged. It follows that the proceeds are not also paymats toward the contract
price; to so reg3rd them would be double-counting.
VI. CALCULATION OF DAMAGES
[6\ Malnar contends that the trial court ened in departirg from tte method of c a l ^ ^
in Rakinsv.Spenaa:, 121 Utah 468,478-79,243 P.2d 446,451-52 (1952) (this method is set out betow). We
have previously held that the factors used in tte Peridns test need not terigidfy adhered to:
Although these are reasonable factors to detemiine damages, they were not mea^
teappMmectoricafly
in every case. In detemiining equitable damages, the trial court may use whatever
factors it finds most appropriate to achieve justice.
Johnson v. Caiman, 572 P.2d 371, 374 (Utah 1977). However, in reviewing the method used by the trial
judge to arrive at a judgment for plaintiffs of $71,183.14, we are left with "a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made." State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191,193 (Utah 1987).
The trial judge in effect returned to the defkiltii^ vendee tte appreciate
This was
error. We stated in Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2dl244,1256 (Utah 1987), that a vendee "is entitled to the
appreciated value of the property o v a the contract purchase pice as long as his or ho- interest has not been
forfeited." (Emphasis added.) However, when the vendee defkilts on property w h i ±
he is not entitled to the appreciated value. The appreciated value, however, negsles the vendor's entitlement to
damages for "loss of advantageous barg3in," tte first factor in tte Pedcins test See Harris v. Shell Dev. Corp.
Nev., Im., 95 Nev. 348, 5 ^ P.2d 731,734 (1979) ('Where ... tte market value of tte lanl at tte time of breach
is higher than tte purchase price, the vendor is entitled to only nominal damages plus proved consequential

damages."); Zareas v. Smith, 404 A.2d 599,60OO1 (N.H.1979) Of tte value at thetimeof breach is greater than
te contract price, the v e i ^ canrecoveronfy nominal da^
accord Spurgeon v.
Drumtelkr, 174 Cal.App.3d 659,665,220 CaLRptr. 195,198 (CtApp.1985); IslariKkntry Join Venture v.
State, 57 Haw. 259,554 P.2d 761,767 (1976); see also Soflfe v. Ridd, 659 P.2d 1082,1085 (Utah 1983)
(defaulting purchaser testified that when he vacated the property, ft Vas worth a s ^
contract price"; thereto, vendor
Werecalculatethe damages using the Perkins formula, which takes into consideration the following elements:
(1) Loss of an advantageous bargain;
(2) Any damage to or depredation of the property;
(3) Any decline in value due to change in market value of the property not allowed in items Nos. 1 and 2;
(4) For the fair rental value during the period of occupancy.
ftridns v. Sperra, 121 Utahat47&-79,243 P.2d at 451-52; Cole v. Rater, 5 Utah 2d 263,267,300P.2d
623,627 (1956).
U\ Loss of advantageous bargain: The contract price of theproperty was
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$152,000. The value of the property, including the disputed 6 aora, at foifeta
Malnarisnot
entitled to loss of bargjrin damages when the property has appreciated m v ^ Soflfe v. Ridd, 659 P.2d at 1085.
f81 Damage to or depredation of the property: The $6,000 attorneyfeesexpended in the eminert domain
action are not damages. Malnarwouki have been requiredtopay them in the absent of te contract with Elder.
Taxes and water assessments are owed in the amount of $1,774.52.
[9][10]The nonreturn of the 6-acre tract constitutes an item of damage. Inasmuch as the trial court found that
Malnar intended to convey that tract at dosing and we have affirmed thatfinding,her damages are $12,000,
representing sixtimesthe: contract price of $2,000 per acre, net the value of the t r ^
($30,000).
Decline in value due to change in market value not allowed above: None.
1111 Fairrentalvalue during the period of occupancy: The trial cant property altowedMato
contract as an alternative to fair ratal value. Seejiillmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d 606 (Utah 1976). Thetotalamourt
paid was $26,109.71. Anotter $10,247.80 accrued to the date of forfeiture.
In summary, damages suffered by Malnar are as follows:
$1,774.52 delinquent taxes and water assessments
12,000.00 value of 6 acres conveyed
26,109.71 interest paid on contract
10,247.80 aocrued interest owing

$50,132.03
Mataar received the down payment on the cortract of $23,500 and the 1981 and 1982 a ^ ^
each, making a total of $76,190.36.
[12] [13] The contract provides that thirty days afler the default of the buyer and hisfailureto remedy the same within five
days after written notice, the sella- may "be released from all oblig3tions in law and in equity to convey said property, and all
payments which have been made theretofore on this contract ty fe Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Sella- as liquidated
damages for the nonperformance of the contact..." ff this forfeits clause is
including the excess of payment made ova" damages, which is $26,058.33, approximately 17 percent of the contract price of
$152,000. We will enforce a forfeiture clause unless we find that the forfeiture would be so "grossly excessive in relation to
any realistic view of loss that might have been contemplated by the parties that it would so shock the conscience thai a court of
equity would refiise such forfeiture." Jensen v. Nielsen, 26 Utah 2d 96,97,485 P.2d 673,674 (1971); accord Strand v.
Mayne, 14 Utah 2d 355, 384 P.2d 396 (1963); Jaoobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59,278 P.2d 294 (1954). Examination of our
case law indicates that this court will enforce the forfeiture clause when the amount of forfeiture does not greatly exceed, or is
less than, the amount of damages. In Cole v. Raker, 5 Utah 2d at 264, 300 P.2d at 624, the vendee had paid $11,600
toward a contract price of $40,000. However, the difference between the purdiase price and the value of te property at te
time of default exceeded $11,600, and this closed further inquiry. A similar result was reached in Weyher v. Peterson, 16
Utah 2d 278, 399 P.2d 438 (1965). In Carlson v. Hamilton, 8 Utah 2d 272, 332 P.2d 989 (1958), the vendee paid $6,680
principal and interesttowarda $22,000 contract price. The excess of payment over damages, which inchKied rental value,
was $2,119.94. The amount "was but 9 1 / 2 pacent of the purchase price, an amount that would exceed but little the real
estate commissiQn that would have to be paid on resale of the property...." 8 Utah 2d at 274, 332 P.2d at 990. InStrandv.
Mayne, 14 Utah 2d at 356-57, 384 P.2d at 396, the vendees forfeited atax)st half the ccxtoct price becau«
and ratal value exceeded what they had paid. Similarly, the vendee in IMmer v. Blocxi, 546 P.2d at 609-10, fo
$12,150 paid to the vendor, but this amourt
of occupancy.
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In these cases, and in the cases cited in Pakinsv. Sparer,
[i]t will be observed that in all cases where the stipulation for liquidated damages was enforced it bore some reasonable
relation to the actual damages which could reasonably be anticipate
forfeiture which would allow an unconscionable and exhorbitait recovery.
Pfeddns v. Spencer, 121 Utah at 474,243 P.2d at 449. In tte instant case, a recovery of over $26,000 in excess of
actual damages shows that liquidated danrages bear no reasonabk
relation^
A forfeiture here would
alfow an unxnscionable recovery. We therefore award plaintiffs the $26,058.33 that was paid in excess of Malnar's
damages. SrePferkins, 121 Utah at 478-79,243 P.2d at 451-52.
[14] Plaintiffs cross-appeal from the trialrourt'sdenial of prqudgm^
A survey of our cases where
prejudgment interest was awarded indicates that interest has been allowed in actions for damage to personal property, Fell v.
Union R*c. Ry., 32 Utah 101, 88 P. 1003 (1907); Uinta Pipeline Corp. v. White Superior Co., 546 P.2d 885 (Utah 1976);
inactions brought ona written cortract, JackB. P&rson Constr. Co. v. State, 552P.2d 107 (Utah 1976); Bjorkv. April
Indus., Inc., 560 P.2d 315 (Utah 1977); Jorgensai v. John Clay and Co., 660 P.2d 229 (Utah 1983); Anderson v. State
FarmCas. &FireCo., 583P.2d 101 (Utah 1978); and in an action to recover a liquidated overpayment of water
subsca^tm charges, Stakerv. Huntington Cleveland Lr. Co., 664P.2d 1188 (Utah 1983). Inmany of these cases, we

stressed that the loss had been fixed as of a definte
accuracy in accordance with well-established mks of damages. No case has been d e d to us where we have alfowed
prejudgment interest in an action such as the instart case, which is for equit^^
"A suit of this nature involving the
invocation of a forfeiture and/or the errforcement of a purchase contract invokes consideration of the principles of equity which
address themselves to the conscience and discretion of the trial court" Fullmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d at 610. In view of the
highly equitable nature of this action where the court has discretion m d e t e ^ ^
if any, to be returned to the
defaulting vendee, we find no error in the denial of prejudgment interest
Remanded for the purpose of amendk^
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., ccmir.

Costs awarded to defendant

